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THE EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION/
REPRESENTATION GAP: AN ASSESSMENT AND
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Bruce E. Kaufmant
Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers ("F&R") have produced one of the
"big books" in modem industrial relations.1 Sure to be discussed and
debated for many years, What Workers Want examines the system of
workplace governance in American firms. In particular, it examines the
form and extent of employee influence and voice through alternative
mechanisms of participation and representation. F&R use data collected
from focus group meetings and telephone surveys with several thousand
employees and managers to paint a detailed picture of not only "what is" in
terms of the prevailing pattern of worker participation and representation,
but also "what would be" if employees were free to choose their desired
form of workplace governance.
As I read their book, four main conclusions stand out. Briefly, they
are:
1. A large "participation/representation" ("P/R") gap exists in
the American workplace in that workers' desire for voice and
influence is much greater than the amount currently available.
F&R describe the situation thus: "given a choice, workers want
'more'-more say in the workplace decisions that affect their
lives, more employee involvement at their firms, more legal
protection at the workplace, and more union representation. '
2. Although workers express a desire for more of all forms of
P/R, the two most preferred are: (1) an independent union and (2)
some type of non-union plant-level (or company-level) joint
worker-management committee similar in broad outline to a
European-type works council. More legal protection at the
workplace, while also valued, is not the preferred approach of the
great majority of workers. Thus, F&R conclude that "almost half
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of American workers want an organization that has considerable
independence at the workplace ....
3. The main cause of the P/R gap is "management resistance."
F&R state that "the chief reason that workers have less influence
at their workplaces than they want is that management is
unwilling to cede power or authority to them. ' 4
4. The P/R gap is a serious social problem that national labor law
should be reformed to reduce. The gap reduces the quality of
working life for employees, conflicts with the fundamental
American belief in democracy and self-determination, and leads
to behaviors that impose economic costs on employers and the
nation, such as higher employee turnover and stunted work
motivation. Thus, F&R conclude: "the right choice for private
action and public policy would be to help workers gain the voice
and re presentation in workplace decisions that they so clearly
want." Although they do not spell it out in What Workers Want,
the clear inference is that F&R favor changes in labor law that
promote a substantially higher level of unionization and
widespread establishment of some form of quasi-independent
works, council-type employee organization.
In this article, I critically evaluate each of these four conclusions. My
judgment, in a nutshell, is that the first conclusion (the existence of a P/R
gap) is true, but F&R most likely overstate its size and seriousness; the
second conclusion (the desire by a majority of workers for a relatively
strong form of representation at the workplace) is also overstated and gives
undue emphasis to stronger, more centralized forms of P/R; the third
conclusion (the central role of management resistance) is only partially true
and ignores other barriers created by government and supported by unions;
and the fourth conclusion (the need for policy reform) is true, but in several
important respects, should take a different direction than what F&R seem
to advocate. Each of these points is elaborated below.
I. CONTEXT
Some background information helps in assessing the findings and
conclusions contained in F&R's book. What Workers Want grew out of a
two-wave survey, called the Worker Representation and Participation
Survey ("WRPS"), conducted under the auspices of the Clinton-appointed
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations
3. Id. at 152.
4. Id. at 63.
5. Id. at 155.
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("Commission") (also known as the Dunlop Commission in honor of its
chair, John Dunlop).6 The charge of the Commission was to determine
how, if at all, American labor law should be changed to foster enhanced
workplace productivity through expanded labor-management cooperation
and employee participation.7  Richard Freeman was one of the
Commission's ten members.8
In my view, What Workers Want is a solid, highly informative piece
of research that explores a number of important, but neglected subjects. Its
authors are also among the most capable and respected in the industrial
relations profession. The reader leaves the book feeling impressed with the
breadth and depth of information presented, and the care and detail with
which the WRPS was put together. F&R are correct, I think, in their claim
that the WRPS provides the most extensive, well-designed analysis of
worker attitudes toward workplace relations conducted in this country for
at least two decades. 9
At the same time, the WRPS and What Workers Want inevitably
reflect the biases and commitments of the authors. It is fair to say that
F&R are broadly sympathetic to the aims and purposes of trade unionism
and collective bargaining. Certainly, both have long advocated the
economic and public welfare benefits of unions, deplored the long-term
decline in union density in this country, and recommended public policy
measures to reverse this trend. 0 Much the same can be said about nearly
all the other academic members of the Dunlop Commission."' Indeed,
F&R in an earlier study made the case that the nation suffers from a serious
6. Id. at 3-4.
7. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding Report,
May 1994, at xi.
8. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 2.
9. Id. at 3.
10. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do?
(1984); Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for Us? Employee Representation
in a Nonunion Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 13 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993); Joel Rogers, A
Strategy for Labor, 34 INDUS. REL. 367 (1995).
11. See, e.g., Ray Marshall, Work Organization, Unions, and Economic
Competitiveness, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 287 (Lawrence Mishel &
Paula B. Voos eds., 1991); Paula Voos, Employee Involvement and Representation:
Economic and Policy Implications, in BACK TO SHARED PROSPERITY 332 (Ray Marshall ed.,
2000) [hereinafter Voos, Employee Involvement]; Paula Voos, Labor Law Reform: Closing
the Representation Gap, in RECLAIMING PROSPERITY 123 (Todd Schafer & Jeff Faux eds.,
1996) [hereinafter Voos, Labor Law Reform]; Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace:
Employee Representation in the Eyes of the Law, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION:
ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 81 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds.,
1993); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990) (Weiler served as legal
counsel to the Commission); Thomas A. Kochan, Using the Dunlop Report to Achieve
Mutual Gains, 34 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 350 (1995).
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"representation gap" and proposed legal remedies that would foster both
greater unionization and European-style works councils. 12 Neither author
can be called "pro-management," and Freeman, in particular, has singled
out "management resistance" as a crucial and largely undesirable factor
behind the long-term decline in union density. 13 Therefore, in evaluating
What Workers Want, these philosophical and policy perspectives must be
kept in mind, as they inevitably influence both the questions asked and the
conclusions reached.
II. Is THERE A PARTICIPATION/REPRESENTATION GAP?
F&R conclude that employees want considerably more P/R in the
workplace than what employers currently provide. F&R say, for example,
"[t]he WRPS shows as conclusively as any survey can that the vast
majority of employees want more involvement and greater say in company
decisions affecting their workplace."' 4 Since the existence of a large P/R
gap is the central fact that drives the rest of the book, a careful evaluation
of What Workers Want must begin here.
On both practical and theoretical grounds, I believe the existence of a
P/R gap is plausible and to be expected. However, in my view, F&R
overstate the size and seriousness of this gap. Here, briefly, are four
reasons why.
The first reason the reported P/R gaps in What Workers Want are
overstated is due to poor question design in the WRPS. F&R calculate the
P/R gap by taking the difference between two numbers obtained from the
WRPS; the first number is the "percentage of workers for whom it is very
important to have a lot of influence" (as determined from the self-reports of
the persons interviewed); 15 the second is the "percentage of workers who
said they had a lot of direct influence and involvement.0 6 The average
value for the first number ("wanting influence") is fifty-five percent, and
the average for the second ("having influence") is twenty-eight percent,
yielding a P/R gap of twenty-seven percentage points.'7 Based on this
number, F&R conclude that workers want twice the amount of influence
they currently have. An alternative measure yields an even larger
measured P/R gap of fifty-three percentage points (calculated as the
12. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 10, at 66.
13. Richard Freeman, Why are Unions Faring Poorly in NLRB Representation
Elections?, in CHALLENGES AND CHOICES FACING AMERICAN LABOR 45 (Thomas Kochan
ed., 1985); FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 10, at 221.
14. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 40.
15. Id. at 48-49, exhibit 3.5.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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"percentage of workers with less involvement than they want"). '8
Close inspection of the survey questions reveals several serious
problems, however. For example, in questioning workers about how much
influence they actually have, F&R asked "how much direct influence and
involvement" they had. '9 But "direct" influence, as commonly understood
by both lay people and academic experts, implies some form of personal
participation of a "face-to-face" or "hands-on" nature, thus excluding by
definition all forms of "indirect" or "representational" participation (e.g., a
plant council or union).20 Some respondents may also have participated in
what is conventionally defined as a direct form of P/R, such as a town hall-
type meeting in which all employees are present, but may nonetheless not
consider it to be "direct influence and involvement" if all they did was sit
and listen to company executives. Thus, it is not surprising that only six
percent of workers said they had "a lot of direct influence and
involvement" in pay-raise decisions, since few companies can provide an
opportunity for individual workers to personally get involved in the wage
setting process. 2' Nonetheless, many of these workers may indeed have
effective influence on salary and other workplace issues through indirect
means, such as representation by union leaders in collective bargaining in
an organized firm or, in a nonunion firm, by fellow workers who serve as
representatives on a gain sharing committee or safety committee. If F&R
had framed this question in the WRPS more broadly, to capture all forms of
direct and indirect employee voice and influence, the measured P/R gap
they report would no doubt be smaller.
A second example will further illustrate the pitfalls here. At various
points in the book, F&R equate the P/R gap with lack of worker "voice"
and "say in the workplace." 22 However, in actually calculating the P/R gap
they use a more restrictive criterion, one that rests on "influence and
involvement." ' 3 But "voice" and "influence" are two very different things:
a voice involves expressing or communicating a thought or desire;
influence is the exercise of power ("muscle") to change or affect a person
or outcome. Undoubtedly, many more workers have an opportunity to
voice opinions and desires to management than have the power to influence
decisions. Thus, using voice as the criterion would certainly have led to a
smaller measured P/R gap.
F&R marshal other evidence besides the data in exhibit 3.5 to support
18. Id.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. See JOHN CoTroN, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT 28 (1993).
21. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 48, exhibit 3.5. For example, even in
universities where faculty governance is the norm, few professors can say that they have "a
lot of direct influence and involvement" in determining their pay raise.
22. Id. at 154-55.
23. Id. at 49, exhibit 3.5.
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their contention that the American workplace suffers from a large P/R gap.
Consideration of this data points out a second reason why their reported
findings are overstated. That is, at various places in What Workers Want,
data is interpreted in ways that have the effect of accentuating or
highlighting the alleged gap in participation and representation. For
example, exhibit 3.1 shows the responses to two questions. One question
is: "Overall, how satisfied are you with the influence you have in company
decisions that affect your job or work life?" 24 The second question is: "If it
were your decision alone, and everyone went along with it, would you
generally like to have more influence in these areas [(various workplace
issues)], less influence, or would you want to keep things the ways they are
now?" Persons looking for an optimistic interpretation of the data would
gravitate toward the first question, as roughly three out of four workers
stated that they were "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" and only
about one out of four workers stated that they were either "not at all
satisfied" or "not too satisfied" with their amount of influence in the
workplace.26 Persons seeking to emphasize the negative, however, would
gravitate toward the second question, since it shows that nearly two out of
three workers reported that they "want more influence."27 Revealingly,
F&R show (using pie charts), but do not discuss, the results of the first
question (except as they bear on a measurement issue), while they discuss
at some length the negative conclusions from the second question and cite
28
these results as evidence in support of a sizable P/R gap.
Also, consider the following example: although F&R acknowledge
that the P/R gap "varies among groups and across workplaces," they
nevertheless go on to describe it as "ubiquitous. 2 9 In a short section in
Chapter Three, however, we learn that much of the dissatisfaction with
workplace influence and involvement is concentrated among what F&R
call "the discontented third."3° They state in this regard, "[w]e found that,
on average, two-thirds of workers were reasonably satisfied with their work
lives, but that the other one-third were dissatisfied, and their dissatisfaction
was closely linked to their lack of influence on the job.",3' F&R go on to
say that the "discontented third" is comprised predominantly of workers
from the lower end of the labor market, such as the less educated,
minorities, and blue-collar workers.3 2 This admission would seem to call





29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. at 43-45.
31. Id. at43.
32. Id.
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into question the "ubiquity" of the P/R gap and, instead, suggest that a
perceived or real lack of influence is a problem primarily affecting only
certain workforce groups. Reinforcing the conclusion, F&R report that
sixty-six percent of workers "usually look forward to going to work ' 33 and,
among these workers, eighty-five percent are "very satisfied" with their
influence in workplace decisions. 34
There is yet a third reason why the size of the P/R gap measured by
F&R is overstated. The questions asked by F&R seek to determine the
strength and direction of workers' desire for influence. But desire by itself
is not an accurate gauge of effective demand. A well-specified demand
35function has to include not only preferences, but also price.
From an individual worker's point of view, "influence" in workplace
decisions is a "good" since it is likely to permit him or her to achieve a
higher level of personal utility (from higher pay, better benefits, etc.). Not
unexpectedly, when workers are asked if they would like to have more
influence at work the large majority responded with a strong "Yes!, 36 But
the same would be true if they were asked about their desire for any other
workplace "good," such as more safety or training (or consumer items,
such as vacations in Paris or new cars). Since all such goods are costly for
firms to provide, it should not be surprising to learn that the amount of
goods workers express a desire for is less than the amount firms supply.
One could take the amount of the good desired, subtract from it the amount
supplied, and call the difference a safety or training (or vacationing in
Paris) "gap," but the evident question is what does this "gap" really
measure? It measures only that people do not have as much of something
as they want. However, this is endemic to life (i.e., is "ubiquitous") and
although regrettable, does not, by itself, demonstrate either a failure in the
economic system or a social problem that needs correction.
A more accurate measure of a P/R gap must take into account not only
workers' desire for influence, but also the price they must pay to get it. As
elaborated below, more P/R does not, generally, come free. It has to be
produced with capital, labor, and other real resources. Hence, workers,
firms, and society at large must balance the benefits of extra P/R against
the costs. Workers may respond that they desire more P/R, possibly in the
form of union representation; but if asked if they are willing to pay thirty
dollars a month for union dues to obtain it, many may say "no." Likewise,
workers at a non-union company may say they want substantially more
P/R. However, if presented with the corresponding cost of a company-
wide system of works councils, they might change their minds. For
33. Id. at 44, exhibit 3.2.
34. Id. at 47, exhibit 3.4.
35. See MILrrADs CHACHOLIADES, MICROECONOMICS 13 (1986).
36. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 41, exhibit 3.1.
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example, if substantially more P/R raises business costs more than
productivity, the firm becomes less competitive and may lower wages or
reduce long-term employment. However, F&R largely bypass these
considerations of cost. The one exception is that they ask respondents if
they would be willing to volunteer two to three hours per month to
participate in a workplace committee. Even at this very modest price, only
one-third of employees replied they would be willing to do so.37 Thus, not
only do F&R's reported P/R gaps overstate workers' effective demand by
omitting price, this last result provides a hint that workers demands may be
"soft," or not very intense.
I now come to the fourth and last reason why F&R's reported P/R gap
is likely overstated. It further supports the conjecture just broached-that
the actual worker demand for more P/R may be modest in size and "soft" in
intensity. If there is indeed a large and widespread divergence between the
amount of workplace influence and what employees want versus what they
have, one would expect to observe various behavioral consequences or
"signals." In the labor market, for example, the employee turnover rate
should be positively correlated with the level of P/R in firms (ceteris
paribus), while wage/benefit levels should be negatively correlated.38
Likewise, in the political arena one would expect dissatisfied worker/voters
to exert pressure on elected officials to pass new laws that increase the
supply of P/R in the workplace. Finally, another behavioral sign should be
a negative correlation between union organizing activity and the level of
P/R in non-union firms.
Do we see these signals from frustrated demand? Only in one area do
F&R present evidence in support of this thesis. As they note, non-union
firms that have extensive employee involvement/participation programs
have a much lower probability of union activity.39 In the other two areas
they present no evidence. Analysis of labor market data, particularly
regarding turnover rates, might well yield results consistent with their
hypothesis, making it unfortunate that they did not further pursue this
angle. Activity in the political arena, on the other hand, seems to point in
the opposite direction. In the conclusion to their study, F&R state, "[t]he
basic message to decision-makers in business, labor, and government is
clear: A huge opportunity exists for America to increase the representation
and participation of workers at their jobs .... Political leaders will find
37. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 55.
38. Workers with more say and influence would be less likely to quit the firm due to
dissatisfaction with wages and other labor conditions, thus causing the extent of P/R and the
employee turnover rate to be negatively correlated. In a competitive labor market, firms
offering more P/R would be more attractive to prospective employees, would have a larger
queue of applicants, and, other things being equal, could offer a lower wage.
39. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 114.
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potential votes for such reforms .... ,40 However, if the unsatisfied
demand for P/R is huge, one is left to wonder why the political and
business leaders have not yet responded. One possibility, presumably
favored by F&R but not spelled out by them, is that both the business and
political market places have significant imperfections that prevent or
impede the ability of competition and the prospect of personal gain to close
the P/R gap. A second possibility is that the P/R gap is in fact much
smaller and softer than F&R maintain and, hence, politicians and business
leaders have little incentive to make P/R reform a top priority item. No one
can say a priori which situation is closer to the truth, but certainly, the fact
that workplace reform was not a central topic of debate and discussion in
the Presidential campaign of 2000 is consistent with the view that F&R
have overstated the size and seriousness of the P/R gap.
1H. THE OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND
REPRESENTATION
The considerations just discussed call into question the validity of
F&R's fundamental proposition-the existence of a significant, widespread
employee P/R gap in the American labor market. Given the limitations and
constraints of the WRPS, it is unlikely that any amount of reexamination
and reinterpretation of the data will provide definitive, empirical evidence
to resolve this issue.
An alternative approach is to examine what theory indicates the
existence and size of a P/R gap. Although F&R's decision to largely
eschew issues of theory in What Workers Want is understandable given
time and space constraints, making such an examination would not only
strengthen the end product, but would have enabled them to present a more
compelling argument in support of their main thesis.4' To illustrate the
potentiality, in this section I use basic economic concepts to consider the
following question: what is the optimal amount of employee P/R in the
workplace? 42  Consistent with F&R's claim, the answer that emerges
40. Id. at 155.
41. An earlier work by Freeman does examine these theoretical issues, but the findings
are not incorporated into the body of What Workers Want. See Richard B. Freeman &
Edward P. Lazear, An Economic Analysis of Works Councils, in WORKS CouNcILS:
CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 27 (Joel
Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995). See also John T. Addison et al., Worker
Participation and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany and Britain, 38 BRIT. J.
INDuS. REL. 7 (2000) (examining and extending the F&R works council and employee
involvement model); David I. Levine & Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Participation, Productivity,
and the Firm's Environment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY 183 (Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990)
(discussing the effects of participation on productivity).
42. The model developed here, as well as much of the discussion throughout the
remainder of this section, is based on Bruce E. Kaufman & David I. Levine, An Economic
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suggests that a P/R gap will indeed exist at many firms, although the size
and seriousness of the gap is likely to vary considerably across worksites,
and may well be smaller in the aggregate than F&R claim.
The optimal amount of P/R can be evaluated with respect to two
criteria. The first criterion is economic efficiency. The second criterion is
ethical and moral beliefs about non-economic goals, such as industrial
democracy and social justice. Both types of outcomes, economic and non-
economic, are regarded by most societies as desirable.
The goal of economic efficiency is to use society's scarce factor inputs
of capital, labor, and natural resources to produce the maximum amount of
goods and services given the state of technology and the structure of
relative prices. Microeconomic theory shows that economic efficiency is
promoted when firms use additional units of factor inputs, as long as the
marginal social benefit from the resulting production is greater than the
marginal social cost of the input.4 When the two become equal, economic
efficiency is maximized and usage of the factor input is optimal.44 In this
schema, employee participation and representation can be considered as
another factor input that firms use to produce output. The optimal amount
of P/R can then be determined using the marginal decision rule just
elaborated.
The optimal amount of P/R can also be determined using ethical and
moral criteria, such as industrial democracy and social justice. The concept
of industrial democracy has been defined in a number of different ways
over the years, ranging from profit sharing to management of industry by
labor.45 However, the general sense of the term that most people have in
mind is broadly analogous to "political democracy"-a system of
workforce governance of "law instead of men," in which employees have
well-defined rights protected by due process methods of conflict resolution
and a voice in the determination of the terms and conditions of employment
and in the administration of workplace rules.46 Employee participation and
representation are core elements of industrial democracy, for only through
these mechanisms do employees gain an explicit voice in workplace
Analysis of Employee Representation, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: HISTORY,
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, AND POLICY 149 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne Gotflieb Taras
eds., 2000).
43. See CHACHOLIADES, supra note 35, at 481-501.
44. See id.
45. INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE AMBIGUOUS PROMISE 45-47 (Nelson
Lichtenstein & Howell John Harris eds., 1993).
46. A classic statement of this conceptualization of industrial democracy is given in
William M. Leiserson, Constitutional Government in American Industries, 12 AM. ECON.
REV. 56, 75-79 (1923). See also Bruce E. Kaufman, The Early Institutionalists on
Industrial Democracy and Union Democracy, 21 J. LAB. RES. 189 (2000); Clyde W.
Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 29
(1979).
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governance and the opportunity to influence management decision-making.
The optimal amount of P/R, in turn, rests on individually held ethical
beliefs about the degree to which the workplace should be structured and
run in accordance with democratic principles. Some people, for example,
will favor a minimal level of industrial democracy, where workers have
only basic, guaranteed, legal rights and an open-door opportunity for voice.
Others will favor extensive industrial democracy in which workers have
numerous protected rights and strong independent forms of P/R. Given
that industrial democracy rests on individual ethical beliefs, the optimal
level cannot be determined using principles of economic analysis, but
instead, must be found through a political process of majority voting by
citizens of the nation state.
A parallel argument can be made about other widely held ethical and
moral beliefs such as social justice. Social justice, like industrial
democracy, is hard to specify in concrete detail. In the eyes of most
though, social justice means that all groups and people in society receive
fair treatment with respect to both the process by which economic rewards
are distributed and the share of the outcomes they receive.47 Social justice
does not mean all economic outcomes should be decided by voting or that
everyone's income should be equal, but it does imply that limits are placed
on the unilateral exercise of authority and the degree of inequality in
income and other economic rewards. Similar to the extent of industrial
democracy, individual citizen-workers will differ on their preferred level of
social justice; the socially optimal amount can only be determined through
some collective choice mechanism.
Because the industrial democracy and social justice arguments are
non-economic in nature, I set them aside for the moment and concentrate
on the economic efficiency rationale. Although the prediction from
economic theory is not iron-clad, the weight of the argument suggests that
firms will, on net, adopt a socially sub-optimal amount of employee
participation and representation.
48
Forms of employee P/R may either be voluntarily adopted by business
firms or mandated by law. From the perspective of a firm's management,
employee P/R is one of a variety of possible human resource practices it
might adopt. The decision to do so, and the breadth and depth of the P/R
program, turns on the impact on firm profits. Similar to capital and labor
services, employee P/R and other human resource practices can be treated
as another factor input into production. The goal of management is to
maximize profits; hence, additional units of a factor input should be
47. See, e.g., RICHARD BRANDT, SOCIAL JUSTICE (1962); KIM MOODY, AN INJURY TO
ALL: THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN UNIONIsM xiii-xxi (Mike Davis & Michael Sprinker eds.,
1988).
48. See Kaufnan & Levine, supra note 42, at 164.
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employed as long as they add more to revenue than to cost. From a firm's
perspective, the optimal level of P/R is therefore determined by adding
additional units, however measured, until the marginal revenue product of
P/R equals the marginal factor cost.49 Importantly, the relevant benefits
and costs that influence the decision-making of the individual firm are
private in nature, meaning they include only those benefits and costs that
actually impact the profit of the firm in question.
The benefits of P/R to a firm come from the additional productivity it
fosters. At least three sources are identifiable. The first is improved
organizational coordination. The job of management is to determine what
products are produced, how they are produced, and who will perform the
individual tasks. In a world of perfect information and unlimited human
cognitive ability (in other words, the textbook model of microeconomic
theory), managers are able to make these decisions without error or cost.
However, in the presence of bounded rationality, imperfect information,
and systemic uncertainty, the job of coordinating production in a large firm
with complex technology is formidable."°  In such an environment,
employee P/R can increase productivity in several ways: it can shorten the
steps in the firm's vertical chain of command, thus improving the quality
and/or timeliness of information reaching top management from the
shopfloor level; ensure that employee perspectives are factored into
information sets and decisions, thus overcoming asymmetrical "framing"
effects; and it can help achieve a more decentralized coordination of
interdependent production tasks by allowing employees to make decisions
that would otherwise be passed up the chain of command to supervisors or
middle management.
A second source of productivity gain from employee P/R comes from
enhanced employee motivation and morale. The productivity of a unit of
labor, like the work hour, is variable since it depends on the willingness
and desire of the employee to exert mental and physical effort to the act of
production. Employee P/R can increase the morale and motivation of
workers, and hence productivity, in several ways. For example, employee
P/R can strengthen trust and confidence by improving the quantity and
quality of communication between management and the workforce.
Workers would make more of an effort or maintain higher morale since
they would better understand the reasons and rationales for management
decisions. Similarly, employee P/R can also contribute to a greater sense
49. Id. at 150; see also Walther Miiller-Jentsch, Germany: From Collective Voice to
Co-management, in WORKs CouNcis 53, 61 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995)
(reporting that the advice given to German employers by a management research institute is
"to consider the works council as a 'factor of production'").
50. See GARY J. MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
HIERARCHY 36 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1992).
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that workplace decisions are fair and equitable, since employees are given
an opportunity to influence decisions rather than have them handed down
as a fait accompli. Employee P/R can also help both sides take a more
long-term view of the employment relationship, thus promoting productive
investments and commitments in training and capital equipment by
fostering an expectation that conflicts and adverse "shocks" to the firm will
be handled through consultation and joint problem-solving, rather than
unilateral cost-cutting and employee layoffs."
Thirdly, employee participation and representation can also promote
better firm performance by reducing principal-agent problems and
opportunism by supervisors and lower-level management. Supervisors and
foremen should implement firm employment policy and deal with
production workers in a way that serves the interests of the organization
and its owners. Due to imperfect information, however, supervisors and
foremen gain discretion to manage the people below them in ways that
either promote their self interest (e.g., engaging in sexual harassment or
demanding an excessive pace of work in order to meet a production
schedule), or work against the interests of the organization (e.g., insensitive
handling of employees, which leads to higher turnover and reduced
morale).5 2  Employee P/R helps solve these types of principle-agent
problems by giving management better information about the behavior of
supervisors and foremen, hence reducing productivity-sapping acts of
opportunism and insensitivity.
For the aforementioned reasons, employee P/R can be a productive
human resource management practice for firms. Therefore, it is possible to
speak of firms as having a "demand" for employee P/R. The level of
demand for P/R is influenced, in turn, by two distinct sets of factors. The
first are variables that determine the relative productivity of P/R to the firm.
Some firms will have a small or nonexistent demand for employee P/R
because they gain little or no additional productivity from it. Others will
reap a large productivity gain and will have a large demand. Without going
into detail, some of the most important variables that increase the
productivity of P/R include: a large scale of production; production
processes characterized by greater technological complexity or knowledge
intensity; interdependent forms of production; workplace conditions that
have a significant "public good" quality; imperfect competition in product
markets; a high level of company-specific training or other such factors
which create a long-term employment relationship and/or makes labor a
strategic asset; an extensive internal labor market; high-performance
human resource management practices; full employment in the
51. See id. at 182-98.
52. See id. at 120-37.
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macroeconomy; and stable levels of economic growth.53
In effect, all of these factors shift the P/R demand curve left or right
for individual firms, creating a large demand for P/R on the part of some
and a small demand on the part of others. For any one firm, however, the
P/R demand curve is downward sloping, reflecting the law of diminishing
returns. That is, holding constant other factors of production, additional
units of P/R at some point lead to increasingly smaller increments in
production and, eventually, to a decrease in production. Formation of a
joint safety council, or a plant-level works council, may at first contribute
to increased efficiency, but one can well imagine that the gain to
productivity will quickly diminish as more time and resources are invested
in these forms of P/R. In effect, a firm's management has to calculate
whether, for example, thousands of hours of management and employee
time devoted to works council operations over the course of a year could be
more effectively used in other ways, such as working at assigned job tasks.
In some firms, the management may conclude that anything beyond a
minimal investment in P/R quickly exhausts the resulting productivity
gains.
The optimal amount of P/R for a firm is determined not only by the
benefit gained in terms of increased productivity, but also by the cost or
"price" the firm has to pay for each extra unit of P/R. The price of
employee P/R is influenced by both direct and indirect forms of cost.54 The
former payments include compensation of employee representatives for
time not worked and payment for staff and administrative expense
associated with P/R programs.55 The latter include a possible increase in
decision-making time, reduced organizational flexibility, higher wage
and/or benefit costs (in order to promote trust and cooperation), and an
increase in the bargaining power of employees (also leading to higher
wages and benefits).5 6 The sum of direct and indirect costs yields a per unit
price which allows the firm to determine its optimal level of P/R from the
demand curve.
Individual firms will compare the private marginal benefit and cost of
additional "units" of employee P/R and select the level or form that
maximizes profit. As indicated, some firms will choose none, others will
choose a modest amount, and still others will demand an extensive amount
of P/R. Given this fact, the next issue is whether the amount or form of
P/R voluntarily chosen by firms will also be: (a) socially optimal in terms
of economic efficiency, and (b) optimal in terms of employee preferences.
I will briefly consider each question.
53. Kaufman & Levine, supra note 42, at 159-62.
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Economic theory shows that the price system in a perfectly
competitive market economy will allocate resources in a manner that
maximizes efficiency.5 7  "Maximum efficiency" implies that no other
allocation of resources can lead to an increase in the production of one
commodity without a decrease in another. A corollary of this proposition is
that firms will use the optimal amounts of all of the factors of production,
including various human resource management practices such as employee
participation and representation. If there is to be a non-optimal use of
employee P/R, evaluated from an efficiency standard, it must arise from the
presence of what economists call "market imperfections."58 Imperfections
include factors such as limited information, public goods, externalities, a
few number of buyers and/or sellers, and coordination failures. 9 In
general, it can be shown that these imperfections will lead firms to adopt a
smaller amount of employee participation and representation than is
socially optimal because they may cause a divergence between the social
benefits and costs of P/R and the private benefits and costs that accrue to
firms. Stated another way, market imperfections, coupled with the
divergence in social and private benefits and costs, lead to a gap in P/R.
The following provides a non-exhaustive list of specific illustrations.
A. The Prisoner-Dilemma Problem
As described above, employee P/R can increase firm productivity and
profits by increasing employee morale and motivation. Typically,
however, the "price" that employees expect for their greater productivity is
a share of the increased profits. These profits may come either directly,
through some kind of gainsharing program, or indirectly, through higher
wages and benefits, or increased job security. Although the potential of a
win-win outcome for the employer and employees exists, the two sides
may nonetheless be at odds due to what economists call a "prisoner's
dilemma" problem.6° The prisoner's dilemma arises from imperfect
information and a lack of credible commitments. Successful operation of a
P/R program requires that both the employer and the employees trust each
other to share the long-term gains and avoid an opportunistic "welshing on
the deal" that works to the short-term gain of one side at the expense of the
other. For example, workers may fear that once they share their ideas for
improved plant operations, or begin to work more diligently, the
management will renege on its promises and layoff redundant employees or
fail to increase wages in line with profits. Conversely, management may
57. See CHACHOLIADES, supra note 35, at 435-54.
58. See id. at 496-500.
59. See id.
60. MILLER, supra note 50, at 21.
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fear that once it empowers workers through a P/R program, employees will
use their influence to promote their own self-interests (e.g., engaging in
longer rest pauses or a slower pace of work). Alternatively, management
may fear that workers will come to regard the higher wages or improved
working conditions as an entitlement, and the program will lose its
motivational force. Because of such fears and uncertainties, the firm and/or
employees may decide not to implement the P/R program, even though
doing so would lead to an increase in productivity for the firm and
economic efficiency for society. Stated another way, the marginal benefit
to society is greater than the marginal private benefit to the parties, creating
a gap in social welfare.
B. Bargaining Opportunism
A related problem arises when management fears that even though
employee P/R may increase productivity and profit, it will also increase the
influence and bargaining power of workers who may use it
opportunistically to capture most of the additional surplus. In effect, from
a management perspective, the increase in the size of the surplus created by
P/R is more than outweighed by the larger share of the pie going to labor.6'
In this case, profit maximizing management will rationally forego
employee P/R because, from a private perspective, the higher wages are
costs that outweigh the productivity benefit. However, from a social point
of view, the higher wages are an income transfer, not a cost of real
resources; hence, the decision of the company to forego P/R results in a
loss of extra output and a loss of economic efficiency.
C. Adverse Selection
Firms that adopt employee P/R typically modify or attenuate the
traditional "hire and fire" employment-at-will policies seen at other, more
traditional, firms. Because of the promise of fair dealing and increased job
security, these firms will attract numerous job applicants. The problem for
a P/R firm is that a disproportionate share of job applicants will be "lemon"
employees who have a higher risk of being dismissed for low
performance-a process known as "adverse selection."6 2  Unless
governmental legislation, or some other device, mandates similar policies
at all other firms, the P/R firm will end up with a more problem-prone, low
performing workforce, thus reducing its incentive to adopt P/R in the first
place.
61. See Addison et al., supra note 41; Freeman & Lazear, supra note 41.
62. MILLER, supra note 50, at 95.
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D. Positive Externalities
Microeconomic theory shows that any good that generates positive
externalities (benefits that third parties have not paid for) will be under-
produced in a free market system.63  Employee participation and
representation may be one such good. One form of P/R, for example, is a
joint safety committee. To the extent that these committees improve safety,
but the benefits (e.g., reduced health care cost) do not accrue to the firm but
to third parties (e.g., families of workers, community hospitals, and
taxpayers), employers will under-invest in P/R relative to this social
optima.
E. Unemployment and Macroeconomic Instability
Conditions of involuntary unemployment and cyclical instability in
the macroeconomic environment can also reduce incentives for firms to
adopt P/R. The presence of involuntary unemployment, for example,
provides firms with an alternative, often cheaper method to motivate
employees-the fear of dismissal.64 Likewise, extensive layoffs that go
with frequent and/or deep recessions reduce the incentive of the firm to
invest in costly employee training, and inevitably corrode the spirit of
cooperation that P/R systems are meant to promote.
F. Principal-Agent Problem
A final example stems from the principal-agent problem. 65  The
"principal" of the firm is the owner or stockholders, and the agent is the
management that is hired to run the firm in the principal's best interest.
The owners' goal is to maximize profit, but due to imperfect information
and costs of policing, the managers gain discretion to run the firm in ways
that promote their interests over those of the principal.66 P/R may increase
profit, but managers may, nonetheless, choose not to implement it because
it detracts from a "good" that increases their utility. Two such goods are
power and control. To the extent that managers have discretion, they may
derive satisfaction from exercising power and control over employees. P/R
reduces these goods so managers may choose to under-invest in employee
participation and representation to maintain them.
In summary, economic theory predicts that in a perfectly competitive
market system, firms should produce the socially optimal amount of
63. CHACHOLIADES, supra note 35, at 499.
64. JOHN COMMONS, INDuSTRiAL GOVERNMENT 269 (1921).
65. MILLER, supra note 50, at 120.
66. Id. at 121.
508 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 3:3
employee participation and representation. Judged from the yardstick of
economic efficiency, no P/R gap will exist. (Note however, employees
may still state that they have less P/R than desired.) Yet, to the extent labor
markets contain imperfections, these imperfections will lead to the
deleterious consequences described above and a shortage of employee
participation and representation relative to the social optimum. Abstracting
from the industrial democracy and social justice rationales, F&R's claim
that a P/R gap not only exists, but is ubiquitous, is, if judged from the
perspective of society, tantamount to a claim that the imperfections and
market failures described above are likewise serious and ubiquitous.
On one hand, I believe that the case F&R make for the existence of a
P/R gap would have been stronger had they included a "theory" chapter
which could have built on insights such as those described above. Theory
suggests that a P/R gap will exist in all but a "perfect" market, and it does
not take much argumentation to convince people that perfect markets exist
only in textbooks. On the other hand, playing the "theory card" would also
lead to potentially troublesome questions about the (alleged) large size and
seriousness of the P/R gap. It is one thing to say that markets are less than
perfect, and thus a gap in P/R is likely to exist. It is quite another, and
more difficult, thing to say that these imperfections are sufficiently
widespread and serious enough to cause the large and ubiquitous P/R gaps
that F&R claim to find.
Market imperfections may indeed be widespread and serious, but F&R
do not present concrete evidence to support this position. In Chapter One
of their book they discuss, in a cursory fashion, why labor markets are not
"spot" markets as assumed in simple economic models.67 They also note
that imperfect information and mobility costs make the "exit" option for
employees--quitting one job for another-a less than perfect solution to
workplace problems from either the individual or social point of view.63
F&R do not go beyond these points in the remainder of the book. Without
knowing more about the size and seriousness of market imperfections and
coordination failures, it is impossible to judge to what extent F&R's
reported P/R gaps do indeed reflect a basic malfunctioning of labor
markets.
I believe it is fair to say that nearly all economists would agree with
F&R's basic thesis that most labor markets do not operate completely like
the spot markets depicted in textbooks. In contrast, I think it is fair to say
that many economists-I conjecture a majority-nonetheless continue to
believe that most labor markets are reasonably competitive. In these cases,
market imperfections are clearly present but are typically of small or
67. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 9-10; see also BRUCE E. KAUFMAN & JuLEL.
HOTCHKISS, THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR MARKETS 317-24 (1999).
68. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 8-14.
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modest seriousness, and the trend is toward greater competitive conditions
in labor markets, not less.69 The majority view may be wrong, but absent
any showing to the contrary, many readers will conclude that their reported
P/R gaps may not be the serious social problem that F&R allege. While
they report that over three-quarters of workers thought greater P/R would
strengthen the competitive position of their companies and improve product
quality (a position supported by a majority of managers), this type of
evidence is at best suggestive in determining the efficiency case for greater
P/R.
70
Maximizing economic efficiency is obviously not the only criterion
for judging the optimal amount of employee participation and
representation. As I already noted, other rationales of a moral and ethical
nature, such as industrial democracy and social justice, can also be made to
justify greater P/R in the workplace. In my view, however, the burden of
proof falls on F&R to demonstrate that, in practice, the gap between the
supply of, and demand for, P/R is large and pervasive for these non-
economic reasons. They must also provide some explanation for the nature
of the imperfections in the political marketplace that prevent society from
getting closer to the optimal level. By not meeting this burden, they leave
their empirical results largely devoid of a well-articulated theoretical or
ethical underpinning.
In sum, F&R document, with data from the WRPS, that workers want
more P/R than most firms provide, albeit subject to the measurement and
interpretation problems noted in the previous section. They do not
adequately explain, however, why competitive forces in the economic and
political marketplaces do not narrow this gap and, correlatively, why this
gap is a significant social problem. It is not surprising, after all, that many
employees want more voice and influence in the workplace. Having more
of these qualities would lead to more of the "goods" that increase a
worker's well being, such as higher wages, shorter hours, more generous
benefits, increased job security, and more respect and dignity from
supervisors. But all economic agents have an unsatisfied demand for
"more," given the unlimited nature of human wants and the scarcity of real
resources. The case F&R have to build is that workers' demand for more
P/R has compelling social merit either on economic efficiency or
69. John Addison & Barry Hirsch, The Economic Effects of Employment Regulation:
What are the Limits?, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP,
125 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997) ("[W]e will argue that broad allegations of market failure
do not, in general, provide a convincing case for mandates."); see also Dale Belman &
Michael H. Belzer, Regulation of Labor Markets: Balancing the Benefits and Costs of
Competition, in GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 179
(Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997) ("The labor markets of the United States have become
increasingly competitive over the last two decades.").
70. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 42-43.
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ethical/moral grounds. In my opinion, the brief discussion they give to this
subject in Chapter One does not go nearly far enough in this direction.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
F&R state that the central finding of their study is: "given a choice,
workers want 'more'-more say in the workplace decisions that affect their
lives, more employee involvement at their firms, more legal protection at
the workplace, and more union representation."71  The implication for
practice and policy is equally clear-cut. In their words:
The basic message to decision-makers in business, labor, and
government is clear: A huge opportunity exists for America to
increase the representation and participation of workers at their
jobs and thereby to improve the quality of working life ....
[The right choice for private action and public policy would be
to help workers gain the voice and representation in workplace
decisions that they so clearly want.72
In marked contrast to the vanilla language, and the "on the one hand
this and on the other hand that" style of most academic treatises, F&R
clearly and unequivocally tell the reader what they think is the "bottom
line" conclusion of their study. This is to be applauded. But what about
the substance of their recommendations and the methods by which these
recommendations are to be accomplished? Here, greater caution is
required.
One can debate, for reasons previously cited, the size and seriousness
of the employee P/R gap. But let us accept, as an operating assumption,
that some gap does indeed exist. The interesting issue is determining the
best way to close this gap.
Surprisingly, F&R remain largely silent on this subject. They state
that the nation's current system of workplace governance is "outmoded"
and that their goal in writing the book is to "spur, and guide, a serious
effort at reforming our national labor policy and developing the labor
institutions and policies that fit modern workers and firms."73 Given this
objective, the reader would expect that F&R would weigh and shift the
evidence from the WRPS and present a set of implications and/or
recommendations with respect to reform of national labor policy at the end
of the book. However, in What Workers Want, no such set of implications
or recommendations are provided beyond the general call for "more."
Apparently, F&R chose to let the facts speak for themselves, allowing
71. Id. at 154.
72. Id. at 155.
73. Id. at 2.
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readers to form their own impressions. This modus operandi has its merits,
but also makes my job as reviewer more difficult since I have to construct,
possibly erroneously, what I perceive to be the policy implications from the
book. Since F&R state that influencing policy remains their goal,' 4 it is
necessary to explore this subject, with the caveat that this discussion is
speculative at times.
I think it is fair to say that in the eyes of F&R, not all forms of
employee P/R are equally desirable or effective. In particular, they tend to
favor systems of indirect representation over direct participation, and
independent union forms of representation over non-union representation.
This preference is apparent in both the way the WRPS was designed and in
F&R's interpretation of the findings.
With respect to the former, F&R acknowledge that they originally
designed the WRPS to cover only systems of workplace representation,
such as works councils and unions; 75 but later, at the urging of management
advisors, they broadened the survey to include methods of direct
76participation, like quality circles and self-managed teams. The final
product, however, still gives most attention to unions and other larger-scale
forms of representation, and does little to explore the extent and
performance of smaller-scale, management-created systems of direct
participation. F&R give only slightly more attention to small-scale,
decentralized, management-created representational committees, such as
gain sharing committees and peer review panels.
In Wave One of the WRPS, for example, the only question asked
about forms of direct participation was: "Some companies are organizing
workplace decision-making in new ways to get employees more
involved-using things like self-directed work teams, total quality
management, quality circles, or other employee-involvement programs. Is
anything like this now being done in your (company/organization)?"7'
Note that forms of direct participation are lumped together with indirect
forms of representation (i.e., "other forms of employee involvement,"
which could be any kind of joint worker-management committee), making
it impossible to say anything definitive about the extent of the former. The
low priority F&R give to these forms of P/R is further revealed by the fact
that no follow-up question exists to learn more about particular types of
direct participation, such as work teams or small-scale representational
committees. The near complete neglect of work teams is particularly
surprising given the fact that such bodies are widely portrayed in the
management and legal literature as the principal forms through which
74. Id. at 16.
75. Id. at 27.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 167.
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employee involvement is achieved at modem-day "high performance"
workplaces."8
Other examples can be cited. Many companies believe, for instance,
that efficiency and workplace relations are promoted by dealing with
employees on an individual basis. However, F&R presumably believe that
employees, if given a chance, would uniformly reject this approach in favor
of some "collective" method.79  Indicative of this expectation, in
constructing the question that asked employees to describe their preferred
type of workplace P/R organization, F&R did not include "no organization
desired" as a response option. To their surprise, a number of workers
volunteered that they were opposed to a workplace organization of any
kind. °
Similarly, many companies prefer to offer employees an opportunity
for voice and influence through a set of small-scale, relatively narrowly-
focused forms of P/R, such as a joint safety committee, dispute resolution
panel, and gain-sharing committee, rather than one plant or company-wide
""union-like" body."1 Their rationale is that this type of decentralized
system is more flexible, cost effective, and better targets specific areas of
82employee concern. To critics, however, this system is preferred by
management for less admirable reasons-it fragments workers, thus
inhibiting the development of a collective identity and exercise of
bargaining power.8'
One can infer that F&R lean more toward the latter group, given the
nature of the question they pose to workers about their preferred type of
P/R organization. That is, workers are asked to choose amongst three
options: more laws, joint employee and management committees that
discuss problems, and joint committees that negotiate or bargain.84
Although the exact nature of the 'joint committee" F&R have in mind is
intentionally left unstated, they clearly envision it to be a plant or company-
wide body, as is clear from their description of it in the singular as "a
potentially new institution-an employee-management committee." 5
78. See, e.g., EDWARD E. LAWLER ImI ET AL., EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND TOTAL
QUALITY MANAGEMENT: PRACTICES AND RESULTS IN FORTUNE 1000 COMPANIES (1992);
Michael H. LeRoy, Can TEAM Work? Implications of an Electromation and Du Pont
Compliance Analysis for the TEAM Act, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 215, 241-44 (1997).
79. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 6-7.
80. Id. at 143.
81. Bruce E. Kaufman, Does the NLRA Constrain Employee Involvement and
Participation Programs in Non-union Companies? A Reassessment, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 729, 778-79 (1999).
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Owen E. Hermstadt, Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA: The Debate, 48 LAB.
L.J. 98, 104-05 (1997).
84. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 150.
85. Id. at 140.
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Other questions in the WRPS about workplace committees also described
them in the singular (i.e., as "an organization").86 A single plant- or
company-wide body, as already noted, is not what many companies desire,
nor even what a number of workers want.
The essential point I am making is that the nature of the questions
asked in the WRPS influenced the nature of the conclusions derived from
it. When these questions are examined closely, there seems to be a
perceptible "tilt" that steers responses toward a position that seemingly
favors more formal, large-scale employee organizations. Had F&R
approached the design of the WRPS from a more "management-oriented"
position, I conjecture that different questions would have been asked and
different conclusions reached. How different that conclusion would be is
an interesting question, but one which at this point is unknowable.
It is also instructive to examine the implications derived by F&R
concerning the optimal forms of employee P/R organizations based on the
questions asked in the WRPS. As previously noted, they do not explicitly
state a conclusion on this matter, but rather present the evidence, draw
inferences, and let the readers make up their own minds. The following
will re-trace the findings and inferences F&R make and develop
conclusions from them:
Finding 1. A large, widespread P/R gap exists in American industry. 87
Finding 2. Employees want more say with management through two
mechanisms: individual, one-on-one dialogue with managers and various
kinds of collectively organized groups and organizations.88 By a ratio of
three to one, American employees express a desire for some kind of
representational organization at work.89
Finding 3. The large majority of employees want a workplace P/R
organization that has several features: joint involvement of management
and workers, cooperative relations with management, and some measure of
independent authority.9°
Finding 4. Aspects of independent authority that workers want in an
employee organization include: either workers or management are able to
raise problems and issues, decisions are jointly determined by workers and
managers, conflicts are resolved by an outside arbitrator or other neutral
third party, and employee representatives are elected by workers. 91
Finding 5. Approximately one-third of American workers state that
86. Id. at 175.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id. at 4-5.
89. Id. at 144.
90. Id. at 142-43.
91. Id. at 146.
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they currently would like a union form of employee representation. 92 If
management is not opposed to unionization, the proportion choosing union
representation rises to forty-four percent. 93 Only fourteen percent are
currently represented by unions,94 implying that the demand for a strong
and independent form of P/R exceeds the supply by an order of three to
one.
Finding 6. The large majority of union members are relatively
satisfied with union representation, and less than one out of ten would vote
to decertify the union. These results suggest, according to F&R, that to
most union members, "to know unions is ... to love them." 95 Union
workplaces, F&R conclude, do a better job satisfying worker desires for
P/R than do non-union workplaces.96
Finding 7. The most important reason why the workers who want
unions do not have them is management opposition.97 Workers are deterred
from seeking union representation because they want to maintain
cooperative relations with management and, furthermore, fear possible
negative repercussions if they seek to organize. If management adopted a
neutral or supportive attitude toward unions, the number of union victories
in representation elections would increase substantially.9"
Finding 8. American firms are very heterogeneous with respect to
their breadth and depth of "advanced" human resource management
("HRM") practices, such as employee involvement ("EI") programs, a
grievance procedure, and so on. The distribution of firms plots a relatively
normal, or "bell-shaped," curve with a minority of firms at the tails and the
large majority somewhere in the middle.99
Finding 9. Employees who work at firms with more advanced HRM
practices express a higher level of satisfaction with work and report that
worker-management relations are generally good to excellent.'0°
Finding 10. Sixty percent of workers reported that their company had
some kind of EI program.0 l Workers approve of EI programs, believe that
they benefit both employees and companies, and think that they promote
improved workplace relations. 2
Finding 11. While El programs help close the P/R gap, they do not
92. Id. at 68.
93. Id. at 69, 87.
94. Id. at 81.
95. Id. at 68.
96. Id. at 68-69, 77.
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id. at 58, 87.
99. Id. at 96, exhibit 5.2.
100. Id. at 99.
101. Id. at 6.
102. Id. at 101, 108.
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eliminate it.' 3 This is particularly true among non-union firms, since they
offer less EI than organized firms and give workers less opportunity for the
exercise of voice and influence.' °4 F&R conclude that EI is, on net, more
effective in unionized firms and that non-union firms are unlikely to
voluntarily provide as much breadth and depth of EI as workers want. ' 5
Paradoxically, although unionism seems to make El work better, the spread
of EI may actually undercut the amount of unionism in the economy since
non-union workers who participate in EI programs express much less
desire for union representation. '°6
Finding 12. Employees express a desire for greater legal protections
in the workplace, particularly in areas such as firing without cause and
layoffs.' 7 Employees also express ambivalence and concern about greater
government involvement in the workplace, worrying that legal procedures
and regulations, such as new laws and going to court, are burdensome, time
consuming, expensive, and often ineffective.' °8
Finding 13. Given a choice, the majority of employees favor a more
workplace-centered method to gain more say and protection.1 9 For
example, they favor methods of alternative dispute resolution, such as
binding arbitration of disputes, and use of workplace committees to
monitor and enforce regulatory standards and employment laws."0
Finding 14. The largest single group of workers (forty-four percent)
want a workplace organization that has a strong degree of independence
from management, while nearly as large of a proportion (forty-three
percent) want an organization that is somewhat independent."' Only a
small fraction desire either no organization or one that depends entirely on
management." 
2
Finding 15. Asked to choose their preferred means of gaining more
say and influence in the workplace, only about one in seven workers prefer
"more laws.""..3  Almost half of workers report that they want an
organization that has considerable independence at the workplace (a union
or strongly independent joint committee), while less than one-third of
workers want a "somewhat independent" organization, and less than one in
103. Id. at 110.
104. Id. at 115.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 106, 110, 113.
107. Id. at7.
108. Id. at 126-28.
109. Id. at7.
110. Id. at 132-38.
111. Id. at 147, exhibit 7.2.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 151, exhibit 7.4.
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ten want no organization at all.'
14
Finding 16. Roughly fifty-eight percent of workers prefer some kind
of joint labor-management committee that is supported by the employer,
discusses a wide range of workplace issues, and has some independence
and power (e.g., arbitration of disputes and election of representatives)." 5
As F&R note, American labor law largely prevents employers from
operating this type of P/R system because it would run afoul of the
"company union" prohibition contained in sections 158(a)(2) and 152(5) of
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")."
6
After digesting these sixteen findings, what would the average person
be led to conclude about the optimal "solution" to the P/R gap? I think a
reasonable estimate is the following four recommendations:
Recommendation 1. The nation needs a substantially higher level of
unionization. Labor law, principally the NLRA, but also other legislation
such as the Railway Labor Act, should be amended in ways that make it
significantly easier and less costly for workers to obtain union
114. Id.
115. Id. at 152.
116. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2) (1996). Section 158(a)(2) states that it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it." 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(2) (1996). Section 152(5), in turn, defines a "labor organization" quite broadly. A
labor organization is "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. §
152(5) (1996). The effect of these two restrictions is that any employer-created or
supported employee representational committee that has bilateral dealings with workers
over any aspect of the terms and conditions of employment is illegal. As Kaufman explains,
these provisions were included in the NLRA in order to ban what are now commonly
referred to as "company unions." See Kaufman, supra note 81. Company unions, also, and
less pejoratively, called employee representation plans, first appeared in the late 1910s and
spread among progressive-liberal non-union employers in the 1920s as a method of joint-
dealing with employees. See id. Many additional employers hastily established employee
representation plans in 1933-34 as a way to comply with the labor provisions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act, or to avoid the wave of union organizing that the Act unleashed.
National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). These new employee
representation plans were widely viewed as anti-social union avoidance devices and threats
to the New Deal economic recovery program. Therefore, language effectively prohibiting
them was inserted into the NLRA. Similar restrictions were also included in the Railway
Labor Act at approximately the same time. Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577
(1926). A thorough overview of this subject is provided in Bruce E. Kaufman,
Accomplishments and Shortcomings of Nonunion Employee Representation in the Pre-
Wagner Act Years: A Reassessment, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: HISTORY,
CONTEMPORARY PRACrICE, AND POLICY 21 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne Gottlieb Taras
eds., 2000) [hereinafter Kaufman, Accomplishments and Shortcomings of Nonunion
Employee Representation]; see also Bruce E. Kaufman, The Case for the Company Union,
41 LAB. HIST. 321 (2000) [hereinafter Kaufman, The Case for the Company Union].
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representation. Possible methods include expedited representation
elections, card check certification, greater financial and criminal penalties
on employers for acts of anti-union discrimination, stronger and speedier
enforcement powers for the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"),
and amending the exclusive representation provision to enable minority
unionism and plural unionism in a bargaining unit.
Recommendation 2. Firms should be required or highly encouraged to
form some type of enterprise-level joint worker-management committee.
This committee should be modeled after a European-type works council or,
alternatively, a more independent, legally secure version of a 1920's style
American employee representation plan. These committees would provide
for independent election of worker representatives, require discussion and
joint decision-making on a wide range of workplace and employment
issues, and mandate some form of third-party resolution of disputes, such
as binding arbitration. They could not be disbanded or substantially altered
by employers, unless approved by workers.
Recommendation 3. Non-union employers should be encouraged to
expand both the breadth and depth of El programs. However, in order for
workers to be able to use these forums to exert influence over employment
issues, the prohibition of company unions contained in the NLRA must be
significantly relaxed. On the other hand, it is important that public policy
not thereby permit the re-emergence of the classic "dominated" or "sham"
company union. These types of organizations fail to satisfy the workers'
desires for at least a semi-independent form of P/R and, further, may be
used by employers as a union/works council avoidance device. Hence, a
significant relaxation of sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5) of the NLRA is
conditioned on labor law reform that guarantees to workers low-cost, easily
117obtainable access to representation by unions and/or works councils.
Recommendation 4. The monitoring and enforcement of employment
and labor laws, and the resolution of disputes, should be shifted to the
workplace as much as possible. In particular, the employees in most
medium to large size firms would be represented either by a union or a
works council-type organization. These organizations would take on
increased responsibility for overseeing and administering employment and
labor laws relating to matters such as safety and health, anti-discrimination
and equal opportunity, and wage and hour restrictions. They would also
provide a quasi-legal forum for dispute resolution, thereby greatly reducing
the number of suits and complaints filed with courts and regulatory
agencies.
Although F&R do not at any point list Recommendations One through
117. National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a), 2(5), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158 (1996). Section
8(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to financially or other support a labor
organization. Section 2(5) defines a labor organization for the purposes of the NLRA.
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Four in What Workers Want, I have some confidence that these
recommendations are indeed close to what they would counsel. One reason
is that it appears to me nearly impossible to read Findings One through
Sixteen above and come to any other conclusion. A second reason is that
F&R have advanced a similar set of recommendations in other articles and
books.'18 Third, these recommendations are similar to those proposed by
several other members of the Dunlop Commission. 9 Finally, other
reviewers of the results of the WRPS have reached the same conclusions
concerning the implicit policy recommendations.Y
V. ASSESSMENT AND ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
As I have already indicated, I believe a prima facie case exists for the
proposition that a free market system will lead to an undersupply of
employee participation and representation relative to the social optimum.
This is true even if judged only by the criterion of economic efficiency, but
becomes even more certain if non-economic goals such as industrial
democracy and social justice are included. I have also suggested reasons
why I think F&R most likely overstate the size and seriousness of the P/R
gap. I now wish to critically examine their proposed solution to the P/R
gap, as it was outlined above. Similar to other parts of their study, the
policy reforms implicitly suggested by F&R have merit but are also unduly
"collectivist" and tilted in favor of labor's interests versus those of
management and society in general.
Sketched below is my critique of F&R's policy position, followed by
an alternative policy reform proposal that I think helps close the P/R gap in
a way that better serves the interests of all parties to the employment
relationship. Before proceeding further, note that my critique of F&R's
position rests on what I infer their position to be, which may or may not be
correct. If the latter is true, the discussion that follows is still useful
because many others who read What Workers Want may come to the same
conclusions that I attribute to F&R. To organize the discussion, I separately
consider union and non-union forms of P/R.
118. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 10; Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck,
Workplace Representation Overseas: The Works Councils Story, in WORKING UNDER
DIFFERENT RULES 97 (Richard B. Freeman ed., 1994).
119. See THOMAS A. KOCHAN & PAUL OSTERMAN, THE MUTUAL GAINS ENTERPRISE:
FORGING A WINNING PARTNERSHIP AMONG LABOR, MANAGEMENT, AND GOVERNMENT
(1994); Kochan, supra note 11; Voos, Employee Involvement, supra note 11; Voos, Labor
Law Reform, supra note 11. In addition to these recommendations, Kochan and Osterman
also advocate other complementary policies, such as expanded training programs.
120. See Leo Troy, Commentary on Freeman & Rogers, What Do Workers Want?, in
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS
To COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 33 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1998).
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A. Union PIR
The first prong of the F&R policy reform proposal, as I have
interpreted it, is to encourage a substantially higher level of unionization in
the economy through changes in labor law. T2 F&R advocate this outcome
on the following grounds: (a) assuming no management opposition, forty-
four percent of the employees say they want union representation, but
currently only fourteen percent have it; (b) the large majority of workers
who have union representation want to keep it, suggesting a relatively high
degree of member satisfaction; (c) employee involvement programs and
works council-type employee committees function more effectively in
unionized firms and in a heavily unionized economy; and (d) unionization
on net promotes, or at least does not harm, economic efficiency. They
identify "management opposition" as the key reason why many workers are
unable to obtain union representation. Hence, labor law should be changed
in ways, as outlined above, that make union joining considerably easier.
Each of these positions is open to question. For example, one can
persuasively argue that F&R overstate employee demand for unionization.
The forty-four percent figure is based on two assumptions: (1) that all
workers who expressed a desire for a union in the telephone interview
actually would vote this way in an actual NLRB election, and (2) that the
absence of management opposition would swing many "no union" votes to
the "yes union" side.1 3 However, this does not necessarily have to be the
case. Certainly the evidence from NLRB representation elections suggests
that a much larger number of workers initially expresses a desire for union
representation than actually vote in favor of it, as indicated by the
substantially greater number of authorization cards signed requesting an
election relative to the number of "yes" votes cast in the election.124 This
attrition may reflect the corrosive effect of management opposition.
However, it may also indicate second thoughts on the part of many workers
121. Freeman has elsewhere stated that he views the optimal level of unionization in the
United States as somewhere between twenty-five percent (the level existing in the middle to
late 1970s) and roughly seventy to eighty percent (the level in Scandinavia). Richard
Freeman, Is Declining Unionization of the U.S. Good, Bad, or Irrelevant?, in UNIONS &
ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 143, 166-67 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992).
The mid-point on this range would be close to the forty-four percent of American workers
that F&R conclude desire union representation. This figure is also quite close to the level of
union density in the public sector, which Freeman cites as an example of what union density
might be in the private sector were it not for employer opposition. FREEMAN & MEDOFF,
supra note 10, at 243.
122. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, 150-55.
123. Id. at 86-89.
124. See JOHN J. LAWLER, UNIONIZATION AND DEUNIONIZATION: STRATEGY, TACTICS,
AND OuTcOMEs 210 (1990); see also Kate Bronfenbrenner, The Role of Union Strategies in
NLRB Certification Elections, 50 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REv. 195 (1997).
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as to the underlying benefits and costs of representation or, alternatively,
that employees were never serious about unionization, but decided to "play
the union card" as a way to exert additional pressure on the company for
improved wages or benefits.
F&R also seem to paint an overly sanguine picture of the degree to
which unions satisfy worker aspirations for voice and influence in the
workplace relative to non-union, employer-created EI programs.'2 Their
conclusion that "to know unions is to love them" is based, in part, on the
fact that nine out of ten union members report they would vote in a new
election to keep the union. But, as F&R note, this predilection may reflect
not satisfaction with the "voice" or "industrial democracy" function of
unions, but rather the desire to keep the above-market wages, benefits, and
job security that goes along with being a union member (the "golden
handcuff' effect). 126  They dismiss this argument on the grounds that
unions are democratic organizations and dissatisfied members can change
the union policies to more closely resemble their preferences;1 27 but this
argument is overly facile. Other studies reveal that a number of unions at
both the local and national level have substantial elements of non-
democratic practice, and some are highly corrupt and/or authoritarian.
128
Further, F&R's survey results show that only one-third of union members
are "very satisfied" with their influence in choosing local union leaders,
and only one-fifth express that same sentiment regarding choice of national
unions leaders.129
F&R also asked workers to list the most important services that unions
provide to members." ° Union members were four times as likely to say
"better pay/working conditions" than "more say in workplace issues,"
again suggesting that members believe that unions mainly exercise
"muscle" to win economic gains rather than express "voice" to
management, although the two are not entirely separate. 31 Finally,
although F&R do not point it out, the WRPS reveals that union members
report just as large a P/R gap, if not larger, with respect to influencing most
aspects of union policy as they do with regard to company policy.
3 2
125. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 70.
126. Id. at 73.
127. Id. at 74.
128. See, e.g., JOHN HUTCHINSON, THE IMPERFECT UNION: A HISTORY OF CORRUPTION IN
AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS (1970); Robert Bruno, Democratic Goods: Teamster Reform and
Collective Bargaining Outcomes, 21 J. LAB. RES. 83 (2000); Michael J. Goldberg, An
Overview and Assessment of the Law Regulating Internal Union Affairs, 21 J. LAB. RES. 15
(2000).
129. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 78, exhibit 4.5.
130. Id. at 79-80.
131. Id. at 79, exhibit 4.6.
132. Id. at4l, exhibit 3.1.
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Exhibit 3.1 shows that between seventy-four and eighty-one percent of
workers are "very satisfied" or "somewhat satisfied" with their influence
on company workplace policy, 33 while Exhibit 4.5 shows that the
percentage of union members that are "very satisfied" or "somewhat
satisfied" with their influence over five dimensions of union policy is lower
in all but one area: seventy-nine percent (choosing local leaders), seventy-
two percent (bargaining wages/benefits), sixty-nine percent (choosing
national leaders), sixty-eight percent (union national political issues
position), and sixty-three percent (union endorsement of political
candidates).TM
F&R are also overly optimistic about the positive relationship between
unions and the adoption and performance of El programs. Certainly, good
reasons exist for a positive relationship. Unions, for example, can pressure
reluctant management to institute or strengthen an El program, while
individual non-union workers typically lack such power. In addition,
unions help balance the power relationship between management and
workers-a factor that promotes more stability and permanence in EI
programs, and gives workers greater confidence that they can speak out and
not suffer retribution from management.' 35 However, unions also work
against successful El programs in ways that F&R do not acknowledge. A
number of unions have been very skeptical about El programs, participate
in them reluctantly, and in some cases refuse to participate altogether.
36
Others agree to participate, but only in return for other benefits, such as a
no-layoff pledge or profit-sharing.137 These demands, however, reduce the
prospective return to an El program and may cause management to forego
the investment. Finally, the large element of adversarialism inherent in





135. See Adriane Eaton & Paula Voos, Productivity-Enhancing Innovations in Work
Organization, Compensation, and Employee Participation in the Union Versus the
Nonunion Sectors, in 6 ADvANCES IN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS 63 (David Lewin
& Donna Sockell eds., 1994); William N. Cooke, Employee Participation Programs,
Group-Based Incentives, and Company Performance: A Union-Non-union Comparison, 47
INDUS. LAB. REL. REv. 594 (1994).
136. See COTrON, supra note 20, at 53; see also GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, INHUMAN
RELATIONS: QUALITY CIRCLES AND ANTI-UNIONISM IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1988).
137. See JOHN P. HOERR, AND THE WOLF FINALLY CAME: THE DECLINE OF THE
AMERICAN STEEL INDUSTRY (1988).
138. See id. Addison critically reviews the econometric evidence that the payoff to El
programs is larger in unionized firms and he concludes that the proposition is
"unsubstantiated." John T. Addison, The Dunlop Report: European Links and Other Odd
Connections, 17 J. LAB. REs. 77, 81 (1996). A more recent study of El programs in Britain
found that the payoff to El is larger in non-union firms. Addison et al., supra note 41, at 28.
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Also implicit in the F&R policy recommendations is the idea that the
works council-type employee committees they endorse will perform better
if complemented by a union.1 39  But the evidence in support of this
proposition comes largely from Europe, where unions specialize in setting
wages and labor standards over broad areas (industries and geographic
regions) while works councils handle plant-level employment issues. This
system is impractical in the United States because collective bargaining is
highly decentralized and unions have a strong presence at the plant level,
implying that unions and works council-type committees would be plagued
with an overlap of functions and organizational rivalry.140 The likely
outcome, particularly if union organizing is made much easier, is that many
of the employee committees in non-union firms would eventually turn into
independent unions-shifting the locus of activity from "voice" to
"bargaining"--while in organized firms they would be absorbed into the
union local. 4
139. Germany is the examplar. Based on a review of European countries, Rogers
observes, for example, that "the continental European systems in which councils appear
most effective have a developed 'first channel' of worker representation and labor-
management dealings, centered on regional or national wage-setting practices and political
bargaining over the social wage and labor market policy, external to the firm." Joel Rogers,
United States: Lessons from Abroad and Home, in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION,
REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 375, 394 (Joel Rogers &
Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995). He goes on to say that "[w]hile the United States seems
unlikely ever to contemplate true peak bargaining between unified union federations and a
unified business community.... more modest efforts to facilitate wage generalization on a
regional or sectoral basis might be considered. The law on multiemployer bargaining might
be amended ..... Id. at 404.
140. Rogers & Streeck, supra note 118, at 100 (noting that where collective bargaining is
less developed and more decentralized, as in Italy, Spain, and Greece, "council powers more
closely resemble those of a local union"). Clyde Summers states that, regarding the
coexistence of a works council and labor union in the same plant, "[t]he first reaction (and
for many the last) is that it would be like trying to keep two bulls in the same pasture."
Clyde W. Summers, Works Councils in the American System, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING,
106, 110 (1997). He concludes that these fears are overstated, saying that, "I see no reason
why the coexistence of a works council and a union in the same plant would cause more
difficulties than the coexistence of two competing unions." Id. But multi-unionism gives
rise to numerous inefficiencies, rivalries, and conflicts, and most certainly would be
strenuously opposed by most employers.
141. Summers, supra note 140, at 130. Freeman alludes to this eventuality, stating that:
[M]ost important, UK adherence to the Social Charter [of the European Union]
will bring mandated works councils which will offer a new field of influence for
unions. Union movements can function effectively with much lower density in a
world of elected works councils than in a world of voluntary recognition: a
largely non-union work-force may elect union activists to represent it on
councils.
Richard B. Freeman, The Future for Unions in Decentralized Collective Bargaining
Systems: US and UK Unionism in an Era of Crisis, 33 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 519, 533-34
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However, if unions contribute to improved productivity and economic
efficiency, as per point (d) above, would not greater unionization
nonetheless be a boon? Once again F&R are most likely overstating the
case. The standard economic critique of unions is that they act much like a
monopolist in the labor market; that is, they use their market power to raise
wages and benefits above the competitive level, leading to higher
production costs and product prices, less output and employment, and a
reduction in economic efficiency. 42 In contrast, Freeman has argued
elsewhere that the voice function of unions leads to lower employee
turnover, higher firm productivity, and other forms of cost saving which, in
the aggregate, outweigh, or at least offset, the "monopoly" costs.143 I think
it is fair to say, however, that the majority of economists are skeptical of
this argument. They grant that unions in some firns and industries have
positive efficiency effects, but that the overall union effect is negative,
especially in the long run, when allowance is made for reduced capital
investment and slower productivity growth.'"
In sum, the gist of my argument is that F&R overstate both the
American workers' desire for union representation and the positive
outcomes that would flow from greater unionization in the economy.
Attempting to close the P/R gap through a substantial increase in union
density would, therefore, be a mistake. However, some more modest
encouragement to union organization may, nonetheless, have considerable
social merit.
I do not accept that simply because one-third of workers state that they
(1995); see also Edmund Heery, Learning from Each Other: A European Perspective on
American Labor, 22 J. LAB. RES. (forthcoming 2001) (stating that works councils would
facilitate "union access to non-union firms"); Sanford M. Jacoby, Reflections on Labor Law
Reform and the Crisis of American Labor, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 219, 226 ("[A] works
council ... transforms an inchoate mass of employees into an organized group ripe for
picking by union organizers. The hassle of being hit with repeated organizing drives is one
reason why employers gave up on independent unions in the 1950s .... ").
142. BARRY HIRSCH & JOHN ADDISON, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF UNIONS 21 (1986);
MORGAN 0. REYNOLDS, POWER AND PRIVILEGE: LABOR UNIONS IN AMERICA (1984).
143. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 10.
144. For example, John Addison and Barry Hirsch review the empirical literature on the
economic impact of unions and conclude that "[w]hile empirical evidence is mixed, the
contention that unions, on average, significantly raise productivity cannot be sustained."
John Addison & Barry Hirsch, Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and Growth: Has the
Long Run Arrived? 7 J. LAB. ECON. 72, 100 (1989). They go on to say that "[s]uch evidence
as we have been able to uncover does not encourage an optimistic view of unionism's
longer-term consequences." Id.; see also BARRY T. HIRSCH, LABOR UNIONS AND THE
ECONONIIC PERFOPMANCE OF FIRMS (1991). Other studies show that unionism leads to a two
to four percent decline in employment per annum on average. See generally Bruce E.
Kaufman, Models of Union Wage Determination: What Have We Learned Since Dunlop
and Ross?, INDus. REL. (forthcoming); Jonathan Leonard, Unions and Employment Growth,
31 INDus. REL. 80,91 (1992).
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want a union, public policy should seek to accommodate this desire. Such
a position ignores, as I have already explained, the economic and social
costs of greater unionization. So, can a more cogent case be made for
stronger laws that better protect and promote union organization? The
answer is "yes" if the additional encouragement to unions is kept within
modest bounds and effective constraints are in place to check monopolistic
union "rent seeking" behavior.1 45
The guiding principle in labor law reform that should be followed is to
identify the ways increased unionism can promote greater economic
efficiency, because this goal clearly benefits society at large and will likely
gain widespread political support.14 6 Then, the non-economic rationales for
greater unionism (e.g., industrial democracy and social justice) should be
introduced, again with an eye to spotting the situations where greater
unionism will most clearly advance the social interest.
Efficiency arguments for unionism can be made at both the
microeconomic and macroeconomic level. 47 With regard to the former,
145. Rent seeking is defined as the expenditure of resources to increase one party's share
of the economic pie, rather than to grow the size of the pie. Unions rent seek when they use
strikes and other forms of economic or political pressure to redistribute income from
company revenues to labor compensation. See Michael L. Wachter, Labor Law Reform:
One Step Forward and Two Steps Back, 34 INDUs. REL. 382, 386 (1995).
146. See id. at 396 (arguing that "the relevant economic question is whether extending
[collective] bargaining to such topics [(issues traditionally determined unilaterally by
management)] increases the joint surplus.")
147. The principle economic justification, as stated in the preamble of the NLRA, for
protecting and encouraging trade unionism is that "[tihe inequality of bargaining power
between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of
contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate
recurrent business depressions .. " 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1996). The "inequality of bargaining
power" argument is almost never cited by contemporary economists (including Freeman) as
a justification for unions. As I have interpreted the term elsewhere an equality of bargaining
power occurs in a market situation of perfect competition because neither employer nor
worker can influence the wage. See Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor's Inequality of Bargaining
Power: Changes Over Time and Implications for Public Policy, 10 J. LAB. REs. 285 (1989).
Labor suffers from an inequality of power when market imperfections and macroeconomic
coordination failures give employers the ability to lower wages and conditions below the
competitive, full employment level. The efficiency case for unions then rests, in part, on the
proposition that labor continues to suffer from some degree of inequality in bargaining
power and a union countervailing power is needed to restore competitive, full employment
labor standards. I argue that labor's inequality of bargaining power has diminished
substantially but still exists among certain workgroups due to various immobilities,
information constraints, lack of effective competition among employers, and excess supplies
of labor. Freeman, on the other hand, appears to assume that there is a "level playing field"
in labor markets per his unqualified assumption that union wage gains are "above
competitive levels" and that the "monopoly face" of unions should be weakened. Thus, the
source of efficiency gain from unions rests on the use of "voice" internal to the firm as
opposed to the exercise of bargaining power to affect wages and labor standards vis a vis
2001] EMPLOYEE PARTICiPATION/REPRESENTATION GAP 525
unionism can contribute to increased economic efficiency in several ways.
For example, it can offset employer monopsony power and exploitation of
labor, caused either by a small number of competing employers in a local
labor market or a constraint on labor mobility, that give individual
employers some degree of market power over "inframarginal" employees
in their workforce. 14' A second possibility is that unions overcome public
goods and externality problems in the workplace, contributing to a more
efficient and competitive supply of working conditions for employees, and
forcing firms to internalize costs they would otherwise shift to society.1 49 A
third is that unions prevent injury or wastage to the firm's and the nation's
human resources by placing a floor under labor standards (e.g., maximum
work pace and overtime hours), thus preventing "destructive competition"
in periods of involuntary unemployment or excess capacity.
1 50
On the macroeconomic side, a principal argument advanced to justify
passing the NLRA was that unionism promotes a more stable, full
employment economy by taking wages out of competition, thus preventing
destabilizing wage deflation and boosting household purchasing power and
consumption expenditure by redistributing income from capital to labor and
external markets. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 10, at 248-49. I note that this
position leaves his justification for unions seriously at odds with the purpose of the NLRA.
It truncates the potential sources of efficiency gain from unionism, immediately cedes to
critics of unions the claim that higher union wages are "monopolistic," and appears to
conflict with his desire that unions be promoted in order to reduce the inequality of income,
which depends on their ability to raise wages. The fact that the economic justification for
unionism contained in the NLRA is so at odds with that advanced by Freeman and many
other contemporary academic supporters of unions may well provide insight on why
national labor policy "no longer works to the good of the American economy." See Rogers,
supra note 139, at 375.
148. HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 142, at 22; Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor's Inequality
of Bargaining Power: Myth or Reality?, 12 J. LAB. RES. 151 (1991); Robert Pleasure,
Collective Bargaining and the Labor-Management Antitrust Exemption, 21 J. LAB. RES. 557
(2000). Kaufman cites as an example of monopsony power pay compression in firms and
universities where those inframarginal workers (e.g., tenured professors) that have mobility
constraints receive below-market pay increases. Kaufman, supra, at 164.
149. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 10, at 8; HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 142, at
189; DONALD R. STABILE, ACTIvIST UNIONISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF
SOLOMON BARKIN (1993); Robert E. Lucore, The Fictitious Commodity: A Union View of
Labor's Antitrust Exemptions, 21 J. LAB. RES. 563 (2000). Lucore states, for example, that
"unions seek to... remove wages, benefits, and working conditions from competition ....
[I]f firms compete on the basis of low labor costs, workers will deteriorate or the community
at large will pay the social costs." Lucore, supra, at 567.
150. Belman & Belzer, supra note 69, at 179; Charles Craypo, Alternative Perspectives
on the Purpose and Effects of Labor Standards Legislation, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION
OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 221 (Bruce E. Kaufmann ed., 1997); Bruce E.
Kaufman, Labor Markets and Employment Regulation: The View of the "Old"
hIstitutionalists, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 11, 28
(Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
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from high income to low income households."" A second macroeconomic
argument is that unions promote productivity growth by encouraging firms
to adopt more efficient HR management practices, spend more funds on
capital investment, and reorganize the workplace to squeeze out costs.
1 52
Finally, unions can have positive effects at both the microeconomic and
macroeconomic levels by stimulating managers to seek out improved
methods of production and employment practice in order to hold the line on
cost.'53
The macroeconomic aggregate demand and supply rationales for
increased unionism are weak. Unionism may, on net, promote stronger,
more stable aggregate demand, but the links are tenuous. Other policy
instruments, such as monetary policy, are available and more effective. In
addition, the costs to the supply side of the economy from greater unionism
(e.g., restrictive works rules, strikes, and slower decision making) most
likely outweigh any benefits on the demand side. 54 Certainly, if most
American citizens were asked to name policy reforms that would spur
growth and competitiveness, few would say "increased unionization." 5
151. See generally Bruce E. Kaufman, Why the Wagner Act? Reestablishing Contact
with Its Original Purpose, in 7 ADVANCES IN INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS 15 (1996);
Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Inflation, Unemployment, and the Wagner Act. A Critical Reappraisal,
38 STAN. L. REv. 1065 (1986).
152. Ray Marshall, Work Organization, Unions, and Economic Performance, in UNIONS
AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 287 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992).
153. HIRSCH & ADDISON, supra note 142, at 208.
154. See Bruce E. Kaufman & David Lewin, Is the NLRA Still Relevant to Today's
Economy and Workplace? 49 LAB. L.J. 1113 (1998); see also Daniel J.B. Mitchell &
Mahmood A. Zaidi, The Dunlop Commission's Omissions on American Labor Market
Policy, 15 CONTEMP. POL'Y ISSUES 105 (1997).
155. It is somewhat anomalous in this regard that the major rationale advanced by the
Dunlop Commission for promoting unions is that they promote more effective labor-
management participation and, hence, productivity and competitiveness, a conclusion partly
foreordained by the nature of the commission's charter. The father of American industrial
relations, John Commons, states that the purpose of unions is "wealth redistribution" and
"protection and mutual aggrandizement" and that their social efficacy should be judged on
this basis. JOHN R. COMMONS, LABOR AND ADMINISTRATION 121 (Sentry Press 1964)
(1913). Although this perspective accords with the underlying purpose of the NLRA and
the tenor of my remarks here, it is not the rationale focused upon by F&R and other
academics on the Dunlop Commission. Rather, they focus on "high performance"
workplaces, such as Saturn and NUMMI, and endeavor to show that unions make these
"high involvement" organizations perform better. See KOCHAN & OSTERMAN, supra note
119; Saul Rubinstein et al., The Saturn Partnership: Co-Management and the Reinvention of
the Local Union, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
339 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993). This type of "supply side"
rationale for unions was also advanced in the 1920s, unsuccessfully, principally in the
context of the labor-management cooperation experiment at the B&O Railroad. See IRVING
BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS 98-101 (1960). But, as Commons points out, workers do not
join unions to help make firms more competitive, they do so to restrict the employer in
various ways and gain higher wages and more secure employment. If unions promote
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Furthermore, the economy has been more stable and able to operate closer
to full employment in recent decades, thus reducing the merits of the
destructive competition rationale.5 6 These same macroeconomic forces of
full employment and stable growth have also helped improve the economic
position and leverage of many workers in the "disenchanted third" of the
workforce, at least relative to what would exist in less prosperous economic
times, such as the Great Depression, when the NLRA was enacted."'
In addition, the degree of employer power over terms and conditions
of employment has, on net, significantly diminished in recent decades.5 s
But some arguments for the efficiency effect of unions retain validity.
Although one-company towns are now largely a thing of the past, some
employers nonetheless continue to have a net power advantage over
workers that is exercised to the latter's disadvantage in the form of
excessively long hours, low wages, or intense pace of work.'5 9 Likewise,
evidence points to the conclusion that market imperfections lead to some
degree of social under-investment in employment conditions and labor
standards in a number of non-union workplaces, such as employee safety
higher productivity, it -is indirectly, and not usually as a goal except in times of weakness
and employment loss. John R. Commons, Organized Labor's Attitude Toward Industrial
Efficiency, 1 AM. ECON. REV. 463 (1911).
156. Kaufman, supra note 150; see also Richard Freeman, War of the Models: Which
Labour Market Institutions for the 21st Century?, 5 LAB. ECON. 1, 7 (1998) ("The fabled
race to the bottom-social dumping-about which some economists and union leaders
worry is largely a myth.").
157. The Labor Market, in ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, 139, 139-62 (1997).
158. Kaufman, supra note 150, at 43; Wachter, supra note 145, at 389. Harry A. Millis
described labor markets in the mid-1930s as follows:
Even in a city like Chicago, an industry may dominate a large community and
the firms engaged in it may control the situation within rather wide limits.
Going beyond this, I could cite a number of instances where associations of
manufacturers or merchants have fixed scales or, indeed, maximum wages to be
paid and have enforced them more successfully than any American state has
enforced its minimum wage standards.
Harry A. Millis, The Union in Industry: Some Observations on the Theory of Collective
Bargaining, 25 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 7 (1935). Most certainly this type of employer control in
local labor markets has substantially declined over the subsequent six decades. Also
relevant is the implication of microeconomic theory that employers' market power over
wages decreases the more elastic labor supply curves are (ceteris paribus). See Freeman,
supra note 156, at I 1 ("Labour supply elasticities seem to be reasonably large along a
variety of dimensions.").
159. See Charles Craypo, Meatpacking: Industry Restructuring and Union Decline, in
CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 63 (Paula B. Voos ed.,
1994); Bernard E. Anderson, Worker Protection Policies in the New Century, 14 J. ECON.
PERSP. 207 (2000); Richard N. Block, Labor Law, Economics, and Industrial Democracy: A
Reconciliation, 34 INDUS. REL. 402 (1995); Mary Williams Walsh, Hot Economy Pushes Up
Overtime, as Fatigue Becomes a Labor Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, at 1.
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and health, pension protection, and time off for pregnant women.160 Large-
scale immigration into the United States, the adverse impact technological
change has on unskilled workers, and the continuing effects of
discrimination also continue to put pressure on labor standards at the
bottom of the labor market. 16' Finally, the union "threat effect" continues to
promote economic efficiency by inducing non-union firms to vigilantly
provide competitive employment conditions.1 62
These considerations lead me to believe that a reasonable case can be
made on economic efficiency grounds that a modest expansion in the size
of U.S. union density would be in the social interest, particularly in the
private sector where the current density rate is slightly less than ten percent.
I stress the word "modest" because the efficiency gains of increased
unionism are likely to be quickly exhausted. This reflects both the decline
in the importance of market imperfections and involuntary unemployment
in labor markets, and the propensity of unions to target organizing and
bargaining power-not the disadvantaged groups that need countervailing
power the most, but on work situations where there are rents to exploit.
F&R take a more optimistic view of this matter, but I side with the opinion
of other economists that the evidence they adduce overstates unionism's
net contribution to improved economic performance.
163
Of course, economic efficiency is not the only criterion on which
public policy is based; hence non-economic considerations must also be
considered. Here, too, a case can be built that society would benefit from a
modest expansion in union density. Many employees in the "disenchanted
third," and to a lesser degree in the middle and upper parts of the job
market, have limited opportunities for voice in their places of employment
and little-to-no protection from unilateral management decisions.' 64 On the
grounds of basic human rights and commonly held moral and ethical
principles, a reasonable case can be made that additional unionization
160. See generally RAY MARSHALL, UNHEARD VOICES: LABOR AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN
A COMPETITIVE WORLD (1987); John F. Burton, Jr. & James R. Chelius, Workplace Safety
and Health Regulations: Rationale and Results, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE
WORKPLACE 253 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
161. See generally LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2001-
2001 (2000).
162. Jeffrey B. Arthur & Suzanne Konzelmann Smith, The Transformation ofIndustrial
Relations in the American Steel Industry, in CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
THE PRIVATE SECTOR 135 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1994) (regarding steel mini-mills); see also
Susan Eaton, Changing Labor-Management Relations in Nursing Homes, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 5 lST ANNUAL MEETING 75 (Industrial Relations Research Association, 1999).
163. See Addison & Hirsch, supra note 69, at 162 ("Overall, then, the evidence indicates
that union effects are real and distortionary. Whatever the positive benefits of collective
voice on firm performance, these seem to have been overshadowed by rent-seeking behavior
as reflected in reduced profitability and lower investment.").
164. MARSHALL, supra note 160.
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would promote the social goal that all employees enjoy a minimal level of
"industrial democracy."' 65 Likewise, a reasonable argument can be made
that the rising degree of economic inequality recently witnessed in the
United States harms social cohesiveness and norms of fairness. Additional
unionism would provide a social benefit to the extent it would raise wages
and other economic rewards among the bottom tier of the workforce.
66
Finally, unions generate a positive externality for society to the extent that
they balance the power and influence of business interests in the political
process and promote the cause of disadvantaged social groups.' 67
Countervailing arguments also exist. A number of unions, for
example, have significant internal elements of non-democratic practice,
such as discrimination against minorities and women, are controlled or
heavily influenced by organized crime and, on occasion, are more
autocratic than the firms they seek to organize. 168 Research suggests that
the decline of union density is only one of many factors contributing to
greater income inequality, and encouragement of greater unionism might
be relatively impotent to reverse this trend, given underlying demographic
shifts and ongoing global economic integration.1 69 Finally, more powerful
unions mean more strenuous lobbying and political campaigning for
various legislative and regulatory measures, such as restrictive trade
policies and burdensome regulatory practices. This promotes the narrow
interests of union members at the expense of the broader interests of
society.1 70 Therefore, industrial democracy and social justice influences
provide an additional argument for a modest expansion of unionism, but
the case for going further is not compelling.
For the reasons cited above, I am led to conclude that some reform of
the nation's labor law is required in order to provide additional protection
and encouragement of the right to organize. The positive case for labor law
reform is further buttressed by the evidence that a minority of employers
exploit the weak penalties and administrative delays built into the current
165. Patricia Greenfield & Robert J. Pleasure, The Myth of Deregulation in a Common
Law System: Feudal Dreams, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP 513 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
166. Voos, Labor Law Reform, supra note 11.
167. John Delaney & Susan Schwochau, Employee Representation Through the Political
Process, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 265 (Bruce
E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993).
168. See sources cited supra note 128.
169. Francine Blau, Widening Inequality by Skill: An American Dilemma, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE FIFTIErH ANNUAL MEETING 1 (Industrial Relations Research Association, 1998);
Mitchell & Zaidi, supra note 154.
170. See Herbert Northrup, Expanding Union Power by Comprehensive Corporate
Campaigns and Manipulation of the Regulatory Process, in GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 533 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997).
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law to illegitimately thwart employees desire for union representation.1
7
1
Thus, I favor some, but not all, of the legislative changes to the NLRA that
were recommended by the Dunlop Commission. My proposed changes to
the NLRA include speedier representation elections from a mean of six or
seven weeks to four, heftier penalties against employer acts of anti-union
discrimination, mediation and arbitration of unresolved first contract
disputes, greater union access to the workplace, and greater ability for the
NLRB to provide injunctive relief to employees harmed by anti-union acts
of employers.
It is my judgment that these legislative reforms would result in only a
modest increase in union density. I conjecture that F&R believe that these
reforms would have a larger impact, based on the assumption that the
frustrated demand for unions is relatively strong and widespread. I also
opine that they would favor stronger incentives for the right to organize
than that which either the Dunlop Commission felt was politically practical
or that which I feel is justifiable on the grounds of social benefit and cost.
Examples of measures that F&R have advocated in other places include
card check certification, one week "quickie" representation elections as
used in several Canadian provinces, relaxation of the exclusive
representation requirement in order to facilitate minority and plural
unionism, and banning of striker replacements.' These options err,
however, in tilting the playing field too far toward labor and harming
economic efficiency and reasoned, un-coerced choice in workplace
representation. 74
171. Richard Hurd & Joseph Uehlein, Patterned Responses to Organizing: Case Studies
of the Union-Busting Convention, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 61
(Sheldon Friedman et al. eds., 1994); LAWLER, supra note 124.
172. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Report and
Recommendations, Dec. 1994, at 18-24. The Commission recommended that representation
elections be held within two weeks, but in my view this unduly compromises the time
needed for management to make its case and for workers to reach a deliberative, reasoned
decision. Too long a campaign allows employers to unduly introduce fear and intimidation,
but too short a campaign allows unions to unduly make false claims and whip-up unrealistic
expectations. Although mandatory arbitration of first contract disputes contains perverse
incentives (i.e., an exaggeration of demands), some such procedure is necessary to
effectuate the employees' desire for collective bargaining, particularly when striker
replacement undercuts the exercise of direct economic power. An increase in financial
penalties on employers for acts of anti-union discrimination seems quite meritorious, given
that race and gender discrimination may result in the assessment of treble damages and
multi-million dollar jury awards, while anti-union discrimination typically requires only
payment of back wages.
173. See, e.g., Freeman & Rogers, supra note 10, at 64-65; Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S.
Labor Relations, 69 CHI.-KENTL. REv. 97, 113 (1993).
174. Not only do card certification and "quickie" elections inhibit reasoned choice, the
former is non-democratic since it compromises the secrecy of the choice and provides the
union with the opportunity to unduly exert pressure and practice discrimination on workers
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B. Non-union P/R
Next, consider the implications of What Workers Want for public
policy reform regarding the level and form of employee participation and
representation in the non-union sector of the economy. As outlined above,
F&R favor policy reforms that mandate or strongly encourage widespread
adoption by non-union firms of some American versions of a European-
style works council.175  F&R also favor legislation that relaxes the
"company union" prohibition in the NLRA so that non-union companies
can discuss terms and conditions of employment with employee
representational committees and councils. However, they favor this
legislation only on the condition that workers have a much more liberalized
right to organize, and that a semi-independent works-council-type
organization be readily available to workers.176
These proposals, like dealing with increased union representation,
have considerable merit but also err on the side of unduly promoting a
centralized and independent form of P/R, favoring the interests of labor
over management, and sacrificing the goal of economic efficiency. As I
have already pointed out, the questions included in the WRPS were not
entirely neutral with regard to discovering workers' preferences for various
types and forms of P/R. In particular, the decentralized, less formal method
of P/R practiced by many employers was given short shrift and respondents
were asked to speculate about the characteristics and features of some
hypothetical plant or enterprise-level employee organization. But given
these caveats, it is nonetheless noteworthy, perhaps the most noteworthy
finding reported in the entire book, that the most preferred organizational
vehicle for P/R on the part of a majority of American workers is a hybrid
for which no real world counterpart in the United States currently exists.
1 77
That is, what the single largest group of workers want, in the context of the
WRPS, is some form of organization that is at least partially financed and
operated by companies, takes an integrative, cooperative approach to the
solution of workplace problems, and discusses a full range of workplace
issues, including company sales and financial performance, day-to-day
production and operations, and terms and conditions of employment.
Workers want an organization that gives employees a modicum of
independence and influence vis-a-vis management, such as by election of
who do not sign cards.
175. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 10, at 63 ("Should such councils be mandated? A
good case can be made that they should, as in Western Europe. But a case can also be made
on efficiency grounds for national encouragement of their voluntary formation.").
176. Id. at 64-65.
177. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 152.
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representatives and third party resolution of disputes.17  But such an
employee organization is clearly illegal under the provisions of sections
8(a)(2) and 2(5) of the NLRA, and efforts of American employers to
establish and operate such committees have been struck down by the
NLRB and the courts numerous times.
179
Although F&R recognize this conundrum, they oppose allowing
employers freedom to re-establish "dominated" employee committees."80
Their solution is to use government legislation to mandate or strongly
encourage some form of plant or company-wide works council or
"Employee Participation Committee." '181 Their approach suffers from
significant conceptual and practical shortcomings. From my perspective,
the central conclusion that comes out of What Workers Want, is that the
best approach toward a solution of the P/R gap is not more government
regulation or mandates on non-union employers to promote councils, but
less. In particular, the single most effective reform government could make
to foster greater P/R in the ninety percent of the private sector workforce
that does not have union representation is to repeal the NLRA's and
Railway Labor Act's prohibition on company unions.
The guiding principle for policy reform should be exactly parallel to
that enunciated above for unions. First, determine the forms of P/R that
most clearly and efficaciously improve economic efficiency; second,
consider the non-economic case for and against various forms of non-union
P/R. If this perspective is adopted, two major anomalies become apparent
in the policy recommendations that flow from What Workers Want.
The first pertains to the role of management resistance. The economic
theory presented in Section Three of this article implies that companies
should welcome, not resist, additional employee P/R as long as it promotes
improved profitability. Indeed, in a perfectly competitive economy, firms
opt for the socially efficient level of P/R and resistance to further P/R is to
178. Id.
179. National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(2), 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(2) (1996); see also
Kaufman, supra note 81; Samuel Estreicher, Nonunion Employee Representation: A
Legal/Policy Perspective, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: HISTORY,
CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, AND POLICY 196 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne Gottlieb Taras
eds., 2000).
180. See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 10, at 64-65 (describing the company union bar
as "the core and legitimate purpose of which is to prohibit management from choosing those
workers who will represent others"). The Dunlop Commission in its final report also
recommended that the company union bar in the NLRA be retained. See supra note 172, at
8.
181. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 10, at 63 ("[W]ould it be feasible and desirable to
graft council-type institutions onto our present labor relations scheme? Yes, we think it
would."). F&R go on to state that government encouragement of such councils "should be
vigorous .... Through such actions, government would send employers the message that it
favors independent forms of worker voice and will smooth employer adoption of them." Id.
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be applauded, not condemned, since management is wisely proportioning
scarce resources. But I also pointed out that market imperfections may
well lead companies to under-invest in employee P/R relative to the social
optimum.'8 2 Hence, management will rationally resist additional P/R even
when the social benefits outweigh the costs. Since markets are not perfect
and imperfections of various sorts are widespread, a prima facie case exists
that management resistance does indeed keep the nation from reaching the
socially optimal amount of P/R. And, equally true, management resistance
is particularly strong and vigorously exercised when the type of P/R
employees want takes the form of independent unionism.
Can we conclude then, as F&R do, that management resistance is the
major contributor to the employee P/R gap and that public policy should
seek to neutralize or override this opposition through legislation
encouraging or mandating new forms of P/R? The answer, on two counts,
is "not necessarily."
The first reason is that it is not evident that management resistance is
in fact the most important obstacle to increased P/R in American
workplaces. Perhaps the most interesting new finding to emerge from
What Workers Want is that the type of employee organization the majority
of workers say they want is prohibited by American labor law because it
takes the form of a "company union;" that is, a management-financed,
jointly-operated representation committee or council that discusses terms
and conditions of employment."8 3 Given this, F&R appear to make a leap
in logic when they attribute the shortfall of P/R to employer resistance,
since it was not employers in the 1930s who lobbied for the NLRA's
section 8(a)(2) ban of employee representation plans, and it is not
employers today who adamantly resist any relaxation of this ban.l 4 Seen
in this light, one could make the argument that it is union resistance that
most contributes to the P/R gap. The reason is because organized labor has
adamantly opposed any modification of sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5)-
modifications that would open the door to more P/R for the ninety percent
of private sector workers who are in non-union firms.'85 Of course, if
182. Kaufman & Levine, supra note 42.
183. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 152.
184. Chris Fuldner, Employee Involvement and Section 8(a)(2): EFCO Manufacturing,
in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, AND
POLICY 453 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne Gottlieb Taras eds., 2000).
185. Jonathan P. Hiatt & Laurence E. Gold, Employer-Employee Committees: A Union
Perspective, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 498 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne Gottlieb Taras eds., 2000). Gold
and Hiatt, speaking for themselves and not in an official capacity for the AFL-CIO, do
concede that liberalization of section 8(a)(2), if complemented by Canadian-style
regulations on organizing and elections, "might make an acceptable legal regime;"
nonetheless, they conclude that the main effect of liberalization would be to give employers
another union deterrence weapon without any appreciable increase in genuine worker
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sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5) were modified so that non-union employers are
free to choose their desired level of P/R, it is likely, for reasons previously
described, that these firms will resist adopting the full breadth and depth of
employee P/R. However, before concluding that employers are the
principal problem and coercive legislative mandates are the answer, the
nation would be well advised to first give employers the chance to
voluntarily augment the amount of P/R in the economy by eliminating the
company union restrictions in the NLRA. This initial step-up in the level
of P/R is the lowest-cost, most voluntary source of additional P/R available.
But, examining this issue further, is it not true that management
resistance is responsible for the stunted supply of one form of P/R,
independent trade unionism, and that the reason the NLRA bans "company
unions" is precisely because employers use them to thwart outside
organization? Both parts of this question must also be considered.
F&R again overstate the case when they claim that management
resistance is key to understanding the low and declining level of union
density in this country. 186 Most observers agree that employers are more
resistant to union organization and practice union avoidance more openly
and with greater vigor than in earlier decades.187 In some cases, they defeat
unions by methods that are unjust or illegal, due to administrative delays,
weak penalties in the law, and endless litigation."' It is for these reasons,
in addition to the efficiency arguments advanced earlier, that I favor
reforms to the NLRA that strengthen the protections of the right to organize
are the better option. Recognizing these facts, however, does not allow one
to conclude that management resistance is the major culprit behind the low
organizing success of unions.
Considerable academic research suggests that the demand for
unionization has declined for a host of other reasons unrelated to
management resistance: structural shifts in the economy away from
traditional union strongholds (such as goods-producing industries, blue-
collar occupations, and male workers); the substitution of government
protection for union protection; the growing competitiveness of markets
(making it more difficult for unions to take labor cost out of competition
and capture rents); improved HR management practices in American
companies; higher reported levels of job satisfaction among non-union
employees; and various perceived shortcomings of unions and collective
empowerment. Id. at 509; see also Hermstadt, supra note 83.
186. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 60-63.
187. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, supra note 7, at 68-
78; Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 5-6 (1993).
188. See sources cited supra note 171.
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bargaining (e.g., stodgy image, overly adversarial)."'
Further, it must be realized that not all forms of management
resistance are anti-social, such as the improved human resource practices
and higher wages and benefits that non-union firms put in place to remain
union-free. Indeed, as Freeman has described in other research, an
important cause of greater management resistance is the secular rise in the
union/non-union differential in labor costs (wages and benefits)-a trend
that, in conjunction with greater competition in product and financial
markets, has forced companies to take a harder position vis-a-vis unions
and collective bargaining.'9 While in earlier decades the union wage
premium could be rationalized as a non-distortionary income transfer of
monopoly rents from capital to labor, in today's more competitive economy
the union tax on capital is less easily absorbed by companies and, therefore,
engenders greater business resistance.' 9 Although unfortunate from the
perspective of unions and their members, this increased opposition may
nonetheless be in the social interest, to the extent that it promotes a more
economical use of the nation's resources. Increased management
opposition, and a decline in organizing success may also be a signal to
organized labor that its basic mission and strategy are increasingly
misaligned with the economic and social environment. 192 Or, looking at
189. See the symposium of articles on this subject in the Spring and Summer 2001 issues
of the Journal of Labor Research (vol. 22). The fact that workers at many firms do not want
unions because they are relatively satisfied with employment conditions is suggested in the
following remark by Freeman: "[T]he employees at Texas Instruments, Motorola and their
peer firms are not hungering for unions [in part due to the presence of EI programs]."
Freeman, supra note 141, at 528.
190. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 10, at 239. An illustrative case study is the
southern paper industry. See Bruce E. Kaufman, The Emergence and Growth of a Non-
union Sector in the Southern Paper Industry, in SOUTHERN LABOR IN TRANSITION, 1945-
1975 295 (Robert H. Zierger ed., 1997). Prior to the mid-1970s, nearly every major paper
mill in the south was unionized, and companies did not actively resist organization of new
mills. But union labor costs began to increase rapidly in the 1970s and product and
financial markets became less accommodative, forcing the companies to take a harder line.
Starting in 1975, the paper companies also began designing new mills to incorporate socio-
technical, "high performance" principles of work organization and human resource
management practice (such as teams, EI programs, and gain sharing) that reportedly led to
much higher employee job satisfaction. The outcome of greater management resistance and
new methods of work organization was that none of the seventeen new paper mills opened
after 1977 were organized by unions.
191. Addison & Hirsch, supra note 69, at 161-62; Mitchell & Zaidi, supra note 154, at
111.
192. The possibility of such a misalignment is strongly suggested in this observation by
Freeman: "The AFL-CIO response to the problems of American unionism has been, at best,
too little, too late, and, at worst, utter miscalculation and blunder." Freeman, supra note
141, at 530. Also suggestive is the proposal advanced by Rogers for a far-reaching,
fundamental reorientation of organized labor's strategy and structure. Rogers, supra note
10.
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this matter a different way, one might ask: What would the economic
impact be if management resistance went to zero, and workers had all the
voice and influence they reported wanting in the WRPS? The
repercussions for long-term competitiveness, living standards, and
employment, I conjecture, would not be positive.
Lastly, recent empirical evidence appears to contradict the F&R
conclusion about the central and debilitating role played by management
opposition. Using the WRPS data set and multiple regression analysis,
Fiorito finds that stronger management opposition is actually positively
related to workers' probability of voting for union representation, in direct
opposition to F&R's claim.' 93 Moreover, using data from a large survey of
American and Canadian workers, Lipset and Katchanosvki find that "a
random sample of U.S. managers express more union friendly attitudes
than Canadian," and "more Canadian than American private sector
employees in non-union workplaces predict employers will oppose
organization harshly," again undercutting the F&R argument that low
American union density is due to a more hostile management. 19 4 What is
responsible for America's low and declining rate of union density? Lipset
and Katchanovski state, "traditional American values that are more
libertarian and individualist, i.e., much less social-democratic, than in
Europe and Canada, have weakened organized labor .... [E]conomic
improvements in successive periods have refurbished the classic American
libertarian and market-oriented values, thereby also weakening potential
union sentiment.' 95
There is also the fear that removing the company union prohibition in
the NLRA will serve mainly to give employers one more potent tool to
thwart outside unionization. From the perspective of F&R, the
consequence of such a legislative change would be to reduce the supply of
the relatively independent, strong form of P/R that the majority of workers
say they want, (i.e., labor unions) and replace it with a weak, management-
dominated form that cannot adequately serve workers' interests. From the
perspective of organized labor, the ability of employers to freely operate
and structure non-union forms of P/R creates the fear that worker demand
for unions would precipitously decline. F&R provide evidence of this fact
in What Workers Want, arguing that relatively few employees in firms with
well-run EI programs say they would vote for union representation. 196 But
these positions are problematic on a variety of counts.
193. Jack Fiorito, Human Resource Management Practices and Worker Desires for
Union Representation, 22 J. LAB. RES. (forthcoming 2001).
194. Seymour Martin Lipset & Ivan Katchanovski, The Future of Private Sector Unions
in the U.S., 22 J. LAB. RES. (forthcoming 2001) (emphasis added).
195. Id. The other major contributing factor they cite is structural change.
196. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 113.
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A false presumption exists among F&R and other critics that
employer-created representation plans are ethically illegitimate, most often
toothless "shams," and are principally used for purposes of union
avoidance.' 97 The Dunlop Commission, for example, touted the virtues of
company-sponsored El programs but nonetheless argued that "dominated"
representational committees and councils (in other words, those created,
operated, and/or supported by management) should continue to be banned
where the subjects of discussion involve substantive aspects of terms and
conditions of employment. 19  However, this rule is illogical and,
paradoxically, violates the principle of free choice it intends to protect. 199 It
is equally true that all other aspects of a nonunion company's human
resource policy are similarly "dominated"-such as its compensation
policy, training programs, and staffing decisions-but no one seriously
argues that these policies should therefore be decided by majority vote of
the employees or declared illegal because they conflict with basic
democratic beliefs and institutions.2°  Why then, should employee
involvement committees and councils be held to a different standard? In
197. Rogers, supra note 139, at 392 ("In many cases, company unions were the shams
they have come to be widely viewed as."); id. at 390 ("[M]ost of these plans gave workers
no real power in decision making."). F&R state that they favor the company union ban
because they support its "core and legitimate purpose of which is to prohibit management
from choosing those workers who will represent others." Freeman & Rogers, supra note 10,
at 65; see also Kochan, supra note 11, at 353; Voos, Employee Involvement, supra note 11;
Voos, Labor Law Reform, supra note 11, at 129.
198. See Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, supra note 172,
at 8.
199. The illogic of this position is evident in this statement made by Senator Wagner
explaining the purpose of the NLRA: "Whatever the men want to do... within a plant, that
is all right, only if it is the free choice of the men. Of course, we are all for that. That is all
I am seeking to do, to make the worker a free man to make his choice.. . ." Amendment of
National Recovery Act-National Labor Board: Hearing on S. 2926 Before the Comm. on
Education and Labor, 73rd Cong. 440 (1934) (statement of Senator Wagner), reprinted in 1
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 440
(1985). But, if free choice is the operative principle, then why should the employees not be
allowed to choose a nonunion form of representation? One possible answer is that
conditions cannot be created within the plant for free choice. However, this premise is
undercut by the NLRA's system of secret ballot election and protections against employer
coercion. These protections may need to be strengthened, but surely, at some level, free
choice can be insured. Another possibility is that workers do not desire company-created
plans, but this was disproved in the 1930s by the large number of workers who voted for a
company union in secret ballot representation elections supervised by Wagner in 1933-34
under the labor boards created by President Roosevelt to mediate disputes arising from the
National Industrial Recovery Act. See generally LEO WOLMAN, THE EBB AND FLOW OF
TRADE UNIONISM 77-79 (1936). The conclusion I come to is that the principle of free choice
was sacrificed in the NLRA in order to explicitly promote trade unionism for economic and
ideological reasons. See Kaufman, supra note 81, at 790-92. Present day opponents of
relaxing the company union ban are caught in the same contradiction.
200. See Kaufman, supra note 81, at 784.
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addition, the historical record does not support the claim of critics, such as
F&R, that argue that company-created councils and committees are
typically powerless or ineffective in serving workers' interests.20 ' For
example, William Leiserson, arguably the most knowledgeable and
objective judge of the merits and shortcomings of the 1920s-era "company
unions," concluded that, "if you take it as a whole, the unskilled and semi-
skilled working people of this country, in the last six years, have obtained
more of the things trade unions want out of employee representation plans
[(company unions)] than they have out of the organized labor
movement., 202 Echoing the findings of the WRPS, Leiserson goes on to
say that "[t]here is even evidence that these workers sometimes deliberately
prefer company unions to the regular trade unions."203
The appropriate test for judging the social efficacy of company HR
practices is not to see that they follow pro forma democratic practices, but
rather to assure they serve the social interest in promoting economic
efficiency, generate mutual gains for all parties to the employment
relationship, and respect basic human rights. How can labor policy ensure
this result? The answer, I believe, is to deregulate the market place for
nonunion employee P/R, ensure that adequate constraints and safeguards
are in place so that competition is effective and fair, and then let employees
exercise free choice. As I have argued elsewhere, one important safeguard
is full employment so that workers dissatisfied with a company-created EI
plan can easily quit and seek work elsewhere. A second important
safeguard is reasonably low cost, unobstructed access to independent union
representation in cases where the "exit" option is costly or obstructed.2
When employees have these two "escape routes," companies may
"dominate" the operation of representation councils and committees, just as
they do the compensation, training, and staffing functions, but the
competition in the labor market and marketplace for alternative forms of
P/R will nonetheless constrain them to operate EL programs in an above-
205board, mutual gain manner.
201. Kaufman, Accomplishments and Shortcomings of Nonunion Employee
Representation, supra note 116; Kaufman, The Case for the Company Union, supra note
116; Daphne Taras, Contemporary Practice with the Rockefeller Plan: Imperial Oil's Joint
Industrial Council, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 231 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne Taras eds., 2000).
202. William M. Leiserson, Accomplishments and Significance of Employee
Representation, 4 PERSONNEL 119, 127 (1928).
203. Id.
204. Kaufman, supra note 81.
205. Conditions of full employment cannot always be counted on and, indeed, the
experience of the Great Depression illustrates that recessions and depressions are the factors
that most disrupt and degrade "high performance" HR strategies, and company-created El
programs in particular. Id. On the one hand, the fact that the economy does not always
operate at full employment provides a rationale for stronger legal protection of the right to
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Yet, won't companies still use these employer-created plans to thwart
outside union organization of their workers? The answer is "yes" and "no."
Progressive, "high performance" employers use EI programs and other HR
practices to gain competitive advantages by fostering cooperation and a
unity of interest in the workplace. One result is relatively high employee
job satisfaction and a lack of interest in a labor union. However, in the
eyes of most people, this type of "union avoidance" is not only benign, but
also in the social interest. It arises from "win-win" employment practices
that increase not only economic efficiency, but also employees' quality of
work life.20 6 Other more overt and anti-social forms of union avoidance are
precluded, however, by the provisions advocated above that in various
ways strengthen the protections of the right to organize in the NLRA. °7
organize, both to offset the consequent weakness of the "exit" escape route and to give
workers countervailing economic power to maintain competitive labor conditions. On the
other hand, the protection of the right to organize and the encouragement given to union
power that are currently provided for in the NLRA were crafted in a historical period when
the economy experienced serious instability and unemployment. This suggests that these
provisions are already strong enough (or are too strong) with respect to giving workers
adequate protection and countervailing power in the contemporary era of sustained growth
and full employment. My proposal to further strengthen the NLRA is, in this light,
"liberal," and motivated by the desire to fully safeguard worker interests given the
uncertainty of continued prosperity and the evidence that a viable union threat effect is a
significant contributor to successful performance of company-created representation plans.
206. Of twenty non-union companies selected in the early 1930s as exemplars of positive
employer-employee relations, fourteen had an employee representation plan. CANBY C.
BALDERSTON, EXECUTIVE GUIDANCE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 9-220 (1935) (describing
individual companies and their human resource practices). Two companies, Polaroid and
The Donnelly Corporation, were recently ordered by the NLRB to disband "dominated"
labor organizations. Both were selected as among "the best 100 companies to work for" in
1984. ROBERT LEVERING ET AL., THE 100 BEST COMPANIES TO WORK FOR IN AMERICA 272,
282 (1984). It is not obvious to most people, I conjecture, how the disestablishment of these
committees serves the social interest, or the interests of workers. Writing in the late 1920's,
Leiserson suggests what I think is the appropriate position:
The weakening of trade unionism that has resulted [from employers' use of
progressive personnel practices] is an undesirable consequence, but who will
say then that we should go back to the days when management neglected its
social responsibilities toward its employees .... The labor movement... [i]f it
is weakened by the activities of personnel management... needs to look to its
larger program.
William M. Leiserson, Contributions of Personnel Management to Improved Labor
Relations, in WERTHEIM LECTURES ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1928 125, 146-47 (1929).
Freeman also attests to the positive motivation behind most nonunion El plans: "Most El
programmes are introduced not as an anti-union device but rather because management
believes that employee participation in workplace decisions is profitable." Richard B.
Freeman, The Future for Unions in Decentralized Collective Bargaining Systems. US and
UK Unionism in an Era of Crisis, 33 BRIT. J. INDus. REL. 519, 528 (1995).
207. I favor an additional legal safeguard that creates a new "unfair labor practice"
provision in the NLRA that would enjoin a nonunion company from creating or modifying a
representational committee upon petition by a labor organization for recognition. This bar
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Although the net effect of these provisions may be a drop in union density,
evidence from Canada, where labor law permits not only "company
unions," but also contains stronger protection of the right to organize,
suggests that the actual effect is neutral, or even positive.2°s
For the reasons just outlined, I believe F&R substantially overstate the
extent to which management resistance is the prime culprit behind the
undersupply of employee P/R. This conclusion leads to the second major
anomaly in their policy recommendations regarding ways of augmenting
the supply of P/R in the nonunion section.
Rather than use a deregulation strategy to increase the supply of
nonunion employee P/R, F&R seek to accomplish this end from the
opposite direction-by imposing new regulation upon nonunion
employers .2 9  They suggest legislative reform that either strongly
encourages or mandates adoption of an Americanized version of the
European-style works council. The final report of the Dunlop Commission
does not advocate such a policy shift (reportedly because it was deemed
politically unrealistic), 21° but in other publications F&R have staked out this
position.21 '
Would works councils be an effective method to solve the employee
P/R gap in this country? From F&R's point of view, they are close to the
ideal, particularly evaluated against other nonunion options. F&R find a
number of problems arising from leaving P/R plans solely to employer
discretion: too few employers implement them; those that do implement
them deliberately structure them to minimize employee influence; often the
employer plans give workers no say over strategic business issues or basic
will prevent blatant, short run use of committees for union avoidance.
208. Daphne Taras, Nonunion Employee Representation: Complement or Threat to
Unions?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
RESEARCH ASSOCIATION (1998) ("[T]here is meager evidence upon which to build this case
[that company unions have hurt long run union growth in Canada]."); see also Daphne Taras
& Jason Copping, The Transition from Formal Nonunion Representation to Unionization: A
Contemporary Case, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 22 (1998). According to a leader of the
Canadian-based Communications, Energy and Paper Union, one-third of the union's new
members have come from raids on employer-created representation plans. Reg Baskin, My
Experience with Unionization of Nonunion Employee Representation Plans in Canada, in
NONUNION EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE AND POLICY
487 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Daphne Taras eds., 2000); Daphne Taras, Portrait of Nonunion
Employee Representation in Canada: History, Law, and Contemporary Plans, in NONUNION
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, AND POLICY 121 (Bruce
E. Kaufman & Daphne Taras eds., 2000) (providing an overview of Canadian labor law
regarding nonunion representation plans, their history, and current status) [hereinafter Taras,
Portrait of Nonunion Employee Representation].
209. Rogers, supra note 139, at 402 ("It is striking, and instructive, that all functioning
council systems involve some degree of state mandate .....
210. Kochan, supra note 11, at355.
211. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 63.
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terms and conditions of employment; and the employer-created plans tend
to have a short half-life, since management can let them atrophy or die as it
pleases.2 2 European-type works councils correct all of these inadequacies:
companies are required to establish a works council if workers so petition;
once in place, the works council can not be unilaterally disbanded by
management; management is required by law to consult with the works
council over a wide range of business issues and to seek approval of the
council on issues directly related to enterprise-related employment
conditions; and the council representatives are elected by co-workers.
2 1 1
The works council, in their eyes, fits as closely as possible the "ideal" type
of P/R organization that the largest majority of workers surveyed in the
WRPS report they want. An added benefit, as F&R see it, is that the works
council can also serve as a locus for internal dispute resolution in the firm
and plant-level administration of employment law (e.g., equal opportunity),
thus providing a more decentralized, cost effective, and expeditious
alternative to litigation in the courts and appeal to government regulatory
agencies.
All of these arguments have merit, and the last is particularly
intriguing given the huge and rapidly rising costs and caseloads associated
with employment-related law suits and charges.2 4  But there are also
negative features that have to be considered. The first is the balance
between benefit and cost. On the benefit side, mixed econometric evidence
exists that works councils in Germany promote productivity. Some studies
find a positive effect, while other evidence points to a negative or neutral
effect.21  Small firms, however, clearly appear to suffer. Case study
evidence also suggests a range of experiences, albeit of relatively small
216magnitude in either direction. More intangibly, works councils also
appear to promote consensus, information exchange, adaptation to change,
and a common organizational culture.217 On the cost side, econometric
studies find that wages are higher and profits are lower in firms with works
councils. Also on the cost side, individual works councils entail a
substantial administrative cost, tend to slow decision-making, make
212. Freeman & Rogers, supra note 10, at 27,35-36.
213. Rogers, supra note 139; Freeman & Rogers, supra note 10.
214. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, supra note 7, at 105.
215. See John Addison et al., Nonunion Representation in Germany, in NONUNION
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, AND POLICY 365 (Bruce
E. Kaufman & Daphne Taras eds., 2000); Addison et al., supra note 41; see also Addison,
supra note 138, at 81 ("It is immediately apparent that there is no consistent evidence of the
assumed beneficial effect of works councils on any outcome measure .... Some of the
evidence actually points to markedly unfavorable effects of works councils.").
216. Kirsten Wever, Learning from Works Councils: Five Unspectacular Cases from
Germany, 33 INDUS. REL. 467 (1994).
217. Id.; see also Miiller-Jentsch, supra note 49, at 53.
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workplace operations less flexible, and introduce a political element into
running the business.
218
Other considerations also counsel caution in moving ahead with works
councils. As already mentioned, for example, transplanting works councils
from Europe to North America may be difficult given the markedly
different institutional and social environments.219 Part of the allure of
works councils in Europe is that they are largely "voice" institutions, given
that the "muscle" function is performed by unions and employer
associations at the industry and regional level. But since union density is
much smaller in this country and bargaining more decentralized, works
councils would inevitably take on both a "voice" and a "muscle" role at
many firms. This combination risks losing some of the positive efficiency
effects from voice due to the adversarialism and information-distortion that
is inevitably engendered in a distributive bargaining game.
This consideration leads to the next major caveat about works councils
in the United States. As they engage in implicit bargaining with
management, workers will often be led to desire more leverage than a
works council provides, given that most are enjoined from explicit
collective bargaining and traditional pressure tactics such as striking.220
More likely than not, many works councils would eventually evolve into
labor unions, just as has happened in years past with many employee
professional associations. 22' Although F&R may well view this outcome as
desirable, I doubt that large-scale unionization of the labor market "through
218. Miller-Jentsch, supra note 49, at 53.
219. Addison et al., supra note 215, at 382. F&R are cognizant of the transplant
difficulties, but nonetheless believe that "it would be feasible and desirable to graft council-
type institutions onto our present labor relations scheme." Freeman & Rogers, supra note
10, at 61, 63. They state they favor mandatory health and safety committees and "strong
encouragement" of other, more broadly structured council-like organizations. Id. at 63.
220. The evidence suggests that employer-created plans are able to maintain a
cooperative, win-win relationship with workers as long as the economic environment and
firm's financial performance are supportive. KOCHAN & OSTERMAN, supra note 119, at 14;
Kaufman, Accomplishments and Shortcomings of Nonunion Employee Representation,
supra note 116; Kaufman, The Case for the Company Union, supra note 116; Taras &
Copping, supra note 208. Yet, when adversity hits and costs must be reduced, an
adversarial, win-lose element quickly emerges. It is in this situation that workers often
become disillusioned or dissatisfied with employer plans and start to consider outside
unionization. Business cycles and other adverse economic shocks not only reduce the
benefits from nonunion EL, as discussed earlier in the text, but also make them more
susceptible to unionization, further reducing employer demand. One implication, ignored
by the Dunlop Commission and most proponents of labor law reform, is that policy
initiatives aimed at maintaining a stable, full employment economy may well do more to
promote employee P/R (and at considerably less social cost) than similar initiatives aimed at
promoting more independent systems of workplace governance. Indeed, I think this is one
of the central lessons of the Wagner Act experience. Kaufman, supra note 151.
221. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 10, at 244.
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the back door" is what the majority of Americans favor. Certainly, I doubt
it can be justified on economic grounds of improved efficiency and
competitiveness.
Rather than works councils, I believe the better approach-at least as
a first step-is to allow employers greater freedom to establish and operate
company-created P/R plans by eliminating the company union prohibition
in the NLRA, in conjunction with the steps previously proposed to
strengthen the protections of the right to organize.222 This method leads to
a win-win outcome since employers are unlikely to adopt such plans unless
they promote efficiency, and at the same time, these plans provide workers
with more voice and influence. For reasons previously elaborated, it is
likely that the new "equilibrium" level of P/R will still fall short of the
socially optimal amount. But rather than adopt a costly and bureaucratic
system of works councils, two other more efficacious solutions are
available. The first, as already proposed, is to modestly strengthen the
NLRA so workers can more easily gain union representation. Not only
does this target employers with the most egregious P/R gaps, but through
the union "threat" effect it motivates all remaining non-union companies to
pay more attention to employee relations and worker influence. The
second solution is to identify specific workplace issues or problem areas
where greater employee influence would clearly yield a net social gain and
legislatively mandate, or highly encourage, some targeted, decentralized
form of joint worker-management P/R. The area that has received the most
attention to date is workplace safety and health. Another area where
current performance appears sub-optimal is in workplace dispute
resolution.2 2 Such a targeted approach is sure to be more "efficiency-
friendly" than a broad-brush works council strategy, and would, at the same
time, provide workers with more voice and influence than they currently
possess.
222. See Estreicher, supra note 187.
223. See David Lewin, Theoretical and Empirical Research on the Grievance Procedure
and Arbitration: A Critical Review, in EMPLOYMENT DIsPuTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER
RIGHTS 137 (Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey M. Keefe eds., 1999). As I have argued
elsewhere, a principal reason employer-created P/R forms under-perform is that employees
fear reprisal and retribution for speaking-out. See Kaufman, supra note 81, at 808. Hence, I
believe a good argument can be made that whenever an employer-created committee deals
with employment disputes, the procedures must conform to minimal standards of due
process, as outlined by the Dunlop Commission or the National Academy of Arbitrators in
ARBITRATION 1995: NEw CHALLENGES AND EXPANDING RESPONSIBILITIES, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 48TH ANNUAL MEETING 298, app. B (Joyce Najita ed., 1996). Obviously, a broader
mandate (e.g., that all non-union workplaces have a formal dispute resolution system that
meets minimal due process standards) would be even more effective in encouraging
employee voice, but the costs also loom larger. Unfortunately, Lewin notes that employees
who grieve tend to suffer more adverse consequences than those who do not, even in
relatively strong, procedurally fair systems. Lewin, supra, at 158-66.
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However, F&R will most likely believe that this approach to
augmenting the supply of P/R does not go far enough, particularly in terms
of providing workers with power and influence over wages and other
market-determined conditions of employment. Among the numerous labor
market problems they see, two loom large. 4 One is the rising economic
inequality in this country, marked by steadily rising real wages for upper
income groups and stagnating real wages for lower income groups. The
second is the "downward escalator" in the labor market, on which many
workers in the middle and lower parts of the labor market appear to be
traveling. This is exemplified by the eroding wages and job prospects of
the less educated and unskilled, and the growth of contingent work that
provides few benefits and little job security. F&R's strategy for correcting
these problems borrows significant elements from European systems and,
in particular, "social democratic" and "corporatist" approaches to political
economy.225 That is, they seek to achieve a more equal distribution of
income and to put a floor under labor standards by promoting unionization,
as unions tend to level income both inside and across firms, as well as
regularize and stabilize employment conditions.226 However, to achieve
this "leveling" and "stabilizing" function, unions need to establish broad
market reach in order to effectively take wages out of competition, as well
as bargaining power to win higher labor compensation (defined broadly to
include things such as improved job security and health insurance). Since
the U.S. economy is highly diverse and decentralized, and union density is
quite low, the current system effectively precludes unions from
accomplishing the wage equalization and stabilization function. Hence, in
the F&R reform program a need exists for new labor law and institutions at
the local, regional, and national level that either directly encourage
widespread unionization or transmit union standards to non-union firms
and workers. In the words of Rogers, "[t]he broad goal is to bring the
totality of the regional labor market under common wage and benefit
norms, while establishing at least minimal union presence in all key
firms.
2 27
224. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 173, at 100 (stating that the negative outcomes of the
present "New Deal" labor relations system include, "lost productivity growth, rising
inequality, a failure to block the 'low road' response to rising international competition,
ineffective enforcement of labor standards, and, less tangible but no less real, the erosion of
democratic norms"); see also KocHAN & OSTERMAN, supra note 119, at 19; Freeman, supra
note 141, at 533; Voos, Employee Involvement, supra note 11; Voos, Labor Law Reform,
supra note 11.
225. See generally Addison, supra note 138 (describing "social democratic" and
"corporatist" approaches).
226. FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 10, at 78.
227. Rogers, supra note 10, at 380; see also Jacoby, supra note 141, at 224 (suggesting
one way the Rogers' idea could be implemented is through an expanded version of the
Davis-Bacon prevailing wage law in the construction industry). Freeman has expressed a
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Economists are divided about the extent and seriousness of these
trends, but I think it is accurate to state that a large majority of them agree
that a discernible increase in income inequality and some deterioration in
the economic position of certain workforce groups has occurred.
2
2
Without debating this issue further, and accepting that these developments
are indeed a social problem, the issue becomes whether and to what degree
the unionization and works council strategy promoted by F&R, and
supported by the other academic members of the Dunlop Commission, is a
desirable approach. I have grave doubts.
I believe that using some combination of unions and works councils to
take labor standards out of competition, or to somehow achieve regional,
industrial, and national coordination, is a near-impossible task in a country
as diverse as the United States, especially in an age of global integration.
Going down this road would impose substantial new costs on firms and the
economy, yield meager-to-modest results, and bring forth calls for even
more extensive and radical labor law reform. Further, using unions and
works councils to improve the economic position of the working poor,
contingent workers, and other disadvantaged groups in the "disenchanted
third" is a relatively blunt instrument, especially given the inherent
difficulty unions have organizing these groups and exerting effective
economic pressure on their behalf. Finally, the unions and works council
strategy does not address the fundamental cause of growing inequality and
downward pressure on labor standards at the low end of the labor market.
More effective policies, likely to yield a far higher social rate of return,
would be immigration reform, investment in improved education and
training, and expanded work and family programs.229  To reiterate, I
support a modest expansion of unionism in order to extend the protection
of independent labor organization to those workers who are most exposed
less expansive and visionary role for the labor movement than articulated by Rogers, but
nonetheless views it, in conjunction with the works council system, as accomplishing
greater wage standardization, integration and coordination of employment practices and
policies. Freeman, supra note 141. As noted by Addison, the "corporatist" inclinations of
F&R and the other members of the Dunlop Commission are revealed in a seldom-discussed
end-section of the Final Report that proposes creation of a "National Forum" comprised of
representatives of labor, business, and government that are to periodically meet, propose
legislation, and promote social dialogue. Addison, supra note 138, at 91. He observes that
this type of tripartite body could be used as an instrument for spreading unionism and works
councils, as has occurred in Europe through directives issued by the pan-national European
Commission created under the Treaty of Rome. Id.; see also Jeffrey Rothstein, The
European Works Councils Directive: A First Step or the Final Word?, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING 368 (Indus. Rel. Res. Ass'n, 1997).
228. See Inequality and Economic Rewards, EcONOMIc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 163
(1997).
229. See, e.g., Mitchell & Zaidi, supra note 154, at 109-113 (reaching a similar
conclusion).
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to exploitation and mistreatment at work; however, grander schemes, such
as those outlined above, are sure to be futile and counter-productive.
VI. CONCLUSION
Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers deserve hearty praise for
successfully undertaking the Worker Participation and Representation
Survey and presenting the results in such an engaging, thoughtful book.
What Workers Want includes important research, presents a wealth of new
and insightful information, and provides much food for thought for all
persons interested in national labor policy and workplace employment
practices.
Since What Workers Want is sure to be an influential and well-known
study, it deserves critical reading and evaluation. It is in this spirit that I
reviewed the book. The fact that this article criticizes and questions its
findings largely reflects the nature of the assignment. Hopefully, this
review succeeds at joining criticism with fairness and balance.
What Workers Want finds that a large and ubiquitous employee P/R
gap exists in the United States. The amount of P/R supplied by firms is
much less than what workers actually want. The gap exists mainly because
employers resist sharing power and control with workers. The central
conclusion is that labor law should be reformed to encourage two
alternative, but complementary P/R organizations-independent labor
unions and an Americanized version of a European-style works council or,
equivalently, a more independent and powerful version of the 1920's U.S.
"company union." Modest additional legal protection, and encouragement
of decentralized, small-scale employee involvement programs by
employers, rounds-out the solution.
I believe that F&R significantly overstate the size and seriousness of
the gap in employee voice and influence in the workplace. A gap exists,
but it is smaller, "softer," and more concentrated in certain subgroups of
the workforce than they lead the reader to believe. Part of the reason the
gap is overstated lies with the design of the WRPS; another part lies with
the way F&R interpret and present the data. More fundamentally, F&R
misidentify the measurement of the gap because they make employees'
demand for P/R a function of only preference ("tastes") and omit nearly all
consideration of cost ("price").
Despite these problems, a cogent case can be made on theoretical
grounds that a competitive market system will under-produce the socially
optimal amount of employee P/R. I demonstrate this point using
elementary economic theory, showing that the size of the P/R gap depends
on the extent of various market imperfections, as well as ethical and moral
beliefs about the importance of non-economic goals, such as "industrial
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democracy" and "social justice." While this analysis supports the claim by
F&R that a P/R gap is likely to exist in the U.S. labor market, it also shows
that providing the full amount of P/R desired by workers is not likely to be
a socially desirable outcome because of the harm done to economic
efficiency. I further conclude that the optimal amount of power and
independence given an employee organization depends, in part, on the
severity of the imperfections and coordination failures in the market
economy; the more severe they are, the more likely labor outcomes will fall
below the competitive level and the more workers should have
countervailing power. Although empirical evidence is mixed, I conclude
that the majority of economists believe that product and labor markets are
reasonably competitive and are becoming more so, thus suggesting a two-
prong P/R strategy. One prong is to encourage powerful P/R organization
(in the form of trade unions, for example) where market imperfections and
coordination failures are substantial. A second prong is to make widely
available and selectively encourage a mix of less powerful and independent
P/R organizations in the broader range of market situations where
reasonably competitive conditions prevail.
Using this conceptual framework, I next examine the policy
implications that flow from the empirical results reported in What Workers
Want. F&R do not explicitly state policy recommendations in the book,
but I derive them from the survey results, their previous writings, and the
final report of the Dunlop Commission. Broadly stated, the major policy
implication of What Workers Want is that labor law should be reformed to
encourage all forms of employee voice, but that special emphasis should be
given to achieving: (1) a significantly higher level of union density and (2)
widespread, if not mandatory, adoption of some type of joint labor-
management P/R committee at the plant and/or company level that pursues
a largely cooperative approach to addressing workplace issues, yet provides
employees with a fair amount of independence and influence. Probably the
best contemporary example of such a committee is a European-type works
council.
My evaluation of these policy recommendations and their
implications, is that they too, are overstated and unbalanced with respect to
the socially optimal amount of employee P/R. Careful analysis of the
WRPS reveals that questions are constructed in a way that most likely
overstate workers' demand for both independent unions and works council-
type organizations. I further conclude that enactment of the F&R policy
regime would entail a serious loss in economic efficiency and could only
be justified to the extent that society highly values achievement of non-
economic goals of industrial democracy and social justice, and believes that
collectivist forms of worker organization are effective instruments in
attaining these goals.
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I support an alternative strategy for solving the employee P/R gap that
is both consistent with the empirical findings reported in What Workers
Want, but also less collectivist and costly in terms of economic efficiency.
My strategy also has two prongs: (1) selective strengthening of the
protections of the right to organize contained in the NLRA (and related
legislation), with the goal of achieving a modest increase in union density,
and (2) elimination of the "company union" prohibition in the NLRA (and
related legislation) so that non-union companies are free to expand the
supply of employee P/R.
The rationale behind the first part of the strategy is that certain sub-
groups of the workforce desire and need the protection of an independent
labor union, and that current labor law inadequately protects their rights to
obtain such protection. In addition, a modestly more potent union "threat"
effect is beneficial to efficiency and human values because it motivates the
large mass of non-union employers to practice better employee relations
and run their non-union P/R plans in a mutual gain, win-win manner. On
the other hand, I also believe that a substantial liberalization of labor law
and an increase in union density is neither desirable on economic grounds
nor what the majority of American workers want.
The rationale behind the second part of the strategy is that a policy of
deregulation will most effectively spur the supply of employee P/R in the
non-union sector of the economy. Although F&R claim that employer
resistance is the major constraint obstructing an increase in the supply of
P/R in the private sector workforce, an equally important factor is fear by
non-union companies that they will be charged under the NLRA with
running an illegal, "dominated," "company union"-like P/R committee.
Removing this constraint would automatically increase the amount of P/R
in non-union firms toward the economically efficient level, since the quest
for profit would lead some firms to expand their P/R plans in terms of both
breadth and depth, beyond the level now allowed by law. Evidence from
Canada, where company unions are legal, suggests that some companies
will indeed initiate formal joint worker-management committees similar to
the type many workers in the WRPS say they want, while many others will
utilize a plethora of smaller-scale, more narrowly targeted and informal P/R
teams, councils, and committees (many of which are also illegal under
present U.S. law).230 Thus, rather than mandate works councils (the
regulation strategy), the more cost effective, easy-to-implement strategy is
to deregulate the marketplace for alternative forms of employee P/R and let
230. See generally Taras, Portrait of Nonunion Employee Representation in Canada,
supra note 208; Anil Verma, Employee Involvement and Representation in Non-union
Firms: What Canadian Employers Do and Why?, in NONUNION EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION: HISTORY, CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE, AND POLICY 307 (Bruce E.
Kaufman & Daphne Taras eds., 2000).
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competition prevail. In addition, the expanded protections of the right to
organize advocated above ensure that employers cannot use these
committees as anti-social "shams" or overt devices for union busting, as
workers with relative ease can opt for the union alternative. Given the
evidence-illustrated in What Workers Want-that successful El programs
substantially reduce workers' desire for union representation, the only
possible loser is organized labor. However, evidence from Canada
suggests that even this fear is overdrawn.
In sum, What Workers Want makes a great contribution to modern
industrial relations scholarship and policy. For the first time in several
decades, the WRPS allows us to hear from a broad cross-section of the
American workforce-what they like, what they do not like, and what they
would like to see done differently. Workers are important stakeholders in
the economic system and their voices should not only be heard, but also
counted. But, What Workers Want also has major shortcomings and leaves
important questions unanswered.
With respect to shortcomings, F&R too hastily and uncritically
advance the notion that what workers want in workforce governance also
serves the social interests and even the long-run interests of workers
themselves. Realistically, if the nation implemented the workforce
governance system suggested by the findings of the WRPS, the American
economy would most likely be less competitive, have a lower standard of
living, and fewer jobs available. Thus, it is highly problematic that the
gains from increased employee voice would outweigh these costs.
Secondly, the book fails to provide an explicit set of policy
recommendations that flow from the findings of the WRPS, and those that
the book implicitly promotes are too costly, "collectivist," and anti-
employer to solve the employee P/R gap. The single most important
finding from the WRPS is that a significant majority of American workers
prefer a form of joint worker-management P/R committee that is currently
illegal under American law. However, neither F&R nor the Dunlop
Commission advocate the most obvious and low-cost solution to this
problem-namely, the elimination of the company union prohibition in the
NLRA.
Moreover, F&R never discuss what is surely the greatest paradox
underlying their study. Despite the fact that only fifteen percent of workers
surveyed favor "greater laws" as their preferred method for dealing with
workplace problems, the United States has pursued this exact approach for
the last four decades. This cleavage represents either a huge disparity
between the preferences of the working population and policy makers, or
stark evidence that F&R's findings are badly biased because they largely
omit consideration of benefit and cost at both the individual and social
level vis-a-vis alternative systems of workplace governance. My
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impression is that the nation gave unions and collective bargaining a thirty
year trial-run (between 1935 and 1965) as the principal instrument for
solving workplace problems, and for a variety of reasons, concluded the
result was increasingly falling short. 1
Commencing with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, America has instead
turned to legislation and the courts as the principal instrument to advance
the economic and social interests of workers. This strategy has many
shortcomings and is escalating in cost, but I see few signs that the nation is
actively considering switching back to collective bargaining in place of
legal enactment, despite the many attractive features of a more
decentralized, enterprise-based system of workplace regulation. 32 Seen in
this light, I conclude that the findings and implicit recommendations in
What Workers Want provide an insightful but ultimately skewed picture of
majority demand for workforce governance and the relative benefits and
costs of labor unions. For this reason, the book is unlikely to impact public
policy in the direction that F&R and their Dunlop Commission colleagues
favor. Paradoxically, however, it may prove influential in making the case
for legal reform of a nature they never intended to promote-legalization of
employer-created, non-union employee representation committees,
including "company union" plans similar to those popular in the 1920s, but
banned by the NLRA in 1935.
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